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Evaluating 
Environmental 
Degradation as a 
Cause of Burma’s 
Rohingya Crisis 
HELENA S. LONG 
 
Abstract 
Over the course of the past decade, 
persecution against the Rohingya ethnic 
group in Western Burma has escalated to the 
point of genocide. Since August 2017 alone, 
more than 730,000 Rohingya have fled their 
homes in Rakhine State to neighboring 
Bangladesh1. Previous studies on the causes 
of this crisis have focused on the colonial 
legacy of discrimination toward ethnic and 
religious minorities in Burma, themes of 
identity and citizenship, and role of social 
media in fueling the violence. Over, this 
paper will consider what may be an 
overlooked factor: the role of environmental 
stress in inciting the conflict. After outlining 
commonly understood causes of the crisis, 
this paper seeks to evaluate the extent to 
which environmental stress factored in by 
(1) examining the status of environmental 
degradation and natural disasters in Burma, 
(2) considering how environmental pressure 
may exacerbate violence against the 
Rohingya, and (3) comparing this crisis to 
ethnic conflict in Sudan, where 
environmental stress was undoubtedly a 
cause of violence. By establishing where 
and how environmental stress played into 
the Rohingya crisis, recommendations to 
reduce the likelihood of environmental 





Over the course of the past decade, 
persecution against the Rohingya ethnic 
group in Western Burma has escalated to the 
point of genocide, with the United Nations 
Human Rights Council finding genocidal 
intent in a 2019 factfinding mission2 and a 
trial in the International Court of Justice 
ongoing.3 Since August 2017 alone, more 
than 730,000 Rohingya have fled their 
homes in Rakhine State to neighboring 
Bangladesh4. Previous analysis on the 
causes of this crisis have focused on the 
colonial legacy of discrimination toward 
ethnic and religious minorities in Burma,5 
themes of identity and citizenship,6 
consequences of the 2011 democratic 
opening including the emergence of 
Buddhist extremist groups,7 and the 
contribution of social media in escalating 
violence.8 However, this paper considers 
what may be an overlooked factor: the 
impact of environmental stress. After 
outlining historical context and the 
commonly understood causes of the crisis, 
this paper evaluates the extent to which 
environmental stress played a causal role by 
(1) examining the status of environmental 
degradation and natural disasters in 
Burma, (2) considering the relationship 
between the environment and violence, and 
(3) comparing this crisis to ethnic conflict in 
Sudan, a frequently cited eco-conflict. After 
establishing where and how environmental 
stress is related to the Rohingya crisis, 
policy recommendations for lessening this 
factor’s role in Burma—as well as in other 
conflict regions— are offered and assessed.  
 
Background and Historical Context  
Burma, also known as Myanmar, is a 
country of approximately 55,600,000 people 
located in Southeast Asia (see Figure 1for 
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map) with an extremely ethnically diverse 
population; the most populous ethnic groups 
are Burman (68%), Shan (9%), Karen (7%), 
Rakhine (4%), Chinese (3%), Indian (2%), 
and Mon (2%).9 For most of the region’s 
history, various ethnic groups maintained 
independent city-states and kingdoms, but in 
the 19th century, Britain conquered Burma 
and incorporated it as a province of the 
Indian Empire.10 In 1937, Britain began 
administering Burma as a separate, self-




Figure 1: Map of Burma administrative 
districts12  
 
From independence until recently, 
Burma has been governed by a series of 
right-wing military and one-party regimes. 13 
In 1989, following a year of violent unrest, a 
new ruling junta changed the country’s 
name from Burma to Myanmar, although 
many countries including the United States 
still do not recognize the name change due 
to the illegitimacy of the government that 
made the decision.14 In the 1990 election, 
the National League for Democracy, a pro-
democracy party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, 
won a landslide victory, but the junta 
refused to hand over power and Suu Kyi was 
placed under house arrest.15 In 1991, Suu 
Kyi gained international recognition when 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while still 
under house arrest; in total, she would spend 
15 of the next 21 years under house arrest 
and was most recently detained in February 
2021 during the country’s latest coup.16  
 Following the 1990 elections, 
General Than Shwe became the paramount 
ruler of the country for almost two decades 
until the 2011 general elections, when the 
military junta was officially dissolved.17 In 
the wake of this democratic opening, 
President Barack Obama became the first 
U.S. president to visit Burma in 2012, 
meeting with Suu Kyi, who had been 
released from house arrest and elected to the 
national legislature.18 President Obama 
commended her as a champion of 
democracy and human rights, thus launching 
Burma’s progress into the international 
spotlight.19 In 2015, the first credible 
election in decades was held, with the NLD 
emerging with an overwhelming victory and 
Suu Kyi becoming the de facto head of 
state.20  
Reforms over the past decade were 
marred by the continuing control of the 
military (also known as the Tatmadaw) in 
daily and political life and proven to be 
short-lived in the aftermath of the latest 
coup.21 The current Commander in Chief, 
Min Aung Hlaing, was recommended for 
investigation into crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and genocide by the UNHRC in 
201922 and assumed all state power after 
leading the Tatmadaw in arresting Suu Kyi 
and other senior NLD leaders in February 
2021.23 
The 2019 investigation into Aung 
Hlaing primarily regarded the intense 
violence against the Rohingya people on the 
western edge of Burma.24 The government 
of Burma recognizes 135 “national races” in 
Burma based on a list compiled in 1962.25 
The Rohingya—all 2.5 million of them—are 
5
et al.: Volume 4, Issue 1




Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2021 6 
not one of these, constituting the world’s 
largest stateless population, meaning they 
are not citizens of any country.26 In fact, 
most Burmese (including Suu Kyi) do not 
even use the word “Rohingya,” rather, they 
consider the group to be illegal immigrants 
from Bangladesh.27 The exact origins of the 
Rohingya are not known, but there is 
evidence that this group has been present in 
the region since the 13th century.28 The 
Rohingya are not the only Muslims in 
Burma—about 4% of the population is 
Muslim, compared to more than two-thirds 
who are Buddhist.29 However, Rohingya are 
distinct from other Muslims in the country, 
living in rural areas of the country’s Rakhine 
State, speaking a dialect of Bengali, and 
having Muslim rather than Burmese 
names.30  
 There have long been divisions 
between the Rohingya and other ethnic 
groups in Burma. During WWII, the 
Rohingya, along with the Karen and Kachin 
minority groups, sided with the Allies and 
engaged in guerilla warfare while the 
Burmans sided with the Japanese.31 
Following independence in 1948, the 
Rohingya were gradually excluded from 
state institutions. In 1974, the Rohingya 
were labelled foreign citizens and mandated 
to carry registration cards to distinguish 
them from Burmans.32 The 1982 Citizenship 
Law then effectively rendered the Rohingya 
stateless by requiring all citizens to either 
(1) be a member of the 135 national races, 
(2) have a pending application under the 
1948 Union Citizenship Act, or (3) have 
conclusive evidence of residence in Burma 
before independence.33 The political 
upheaval around 1990 further worsened 
conditions for the Rohingya: a campaign 
against Muslims was seen as strengthening 
the military government’s national 
credentials among Buddhists.34 Nearly 
300,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in the 
early 1990s, claiming the military forced 
them from their homes,35 and the Tatmadaw 
restricted the population’s movement within 
Rakhine state.36 In 1995, the UNHCR 
pressured Burma into providing “Temporary 
Registration Cards” to the Rohingya, but 
violence continued past the turn of the 
century with attacks on Muslim schools and 
places of worship.37 In 2005, a two-child 
policy was introduced in Rakhine State, 
solely for the Rohingya population.38   
 Violence worsened after the 
democratic opening of 2011.39 In June 2012, 
the alleged rape and murder of a Rakhine 
woman by three Muslim youths incited a 
killing spree.40 The Rakhine are the largest 
ethnic group in Rakhine state, and are 
predominately Buddhist; in 2009, insurgents 
formed the Arakan Army seeking self-
determination for the Rakhine people, 
adding another complicated dimension to 
the conflict as the army clashes with both 
the Tatmadaw and Rohingya.41 The violence 
in 2012 between Rakhine and Rohingya 
communities left at least 100 people dead 
and left thousands of buildings including 
homes, mosques, monasteries, and schools 
burned down.42  
2015 is generally considered the start 
of the Rohingya refugee crisis, as increasing 
“ghettoization, sporadic massacres, and 
restrictions on movement” of the Rohingya 
caused thousands to flee on rickety boats to 
other Southeast Asian countries.43 In 2017, 
the Tatmadaw began a “clearance 
operation,” which included “extra judicial 
killings, gang rapes, arson—all argued to 
constitute genocide, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.”44 Some 700,000 
Rohingya fled Burma to refugee camps in 
Bangladesh, leaving just about 200,000 
Rohingya in Rakhine State by October 
2018.45 In 2019, Burmese authorities 
claimed the Rohingya could return, and 
began operating “reception centers” near the 
border, but these centers are often empty due 
to the displaced people’s deep distrust that 
6
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they will return to safe conditions.46 
Findings from the 2019 UNHRC factfinding 
mission found that although “clearance 
operations” on the scale of 2017 ceased, “the 
Rohingya remain the target of a Government 
attack aimed at erasing the identity and 
removing them from Myanmar...With 
another year having passed without 
improvements to their dire living conditions, 
prospects for accountability or legal 
recognition as citizens of Myanmar, their 
plight can only be considered as having 
deteriorated.”47  
 
Established Causes of the Conflict  
Most existing scholarship on the causes of 
the Rohingya crisis focuses on the long 
history of ethnic conflict and discrimination 
in Burma. Jobair Alam argues that this 
discrimination is rooted in the British 
colonial era, stating that before the arrival of 
the British, “the different groups that make 
up the complex ethnic tapestry of Burma 
were never under the authority of a single 
government.”48 The British era created the 
majority-minority divide and deep 
nationalism tied to Buddhist identity that 
exists to this day.49 After independence, 
discrimination was solidified into laws such 
as the 1982 Citizenship Law which rendered 
the Rohingya stateless and deprived them of 
access to education, health services, and 
employment.50 This stripping of citizenship 
“largely (re)shaped the identity of the 
Rohingya in Myanmar as a non-Burman 
Muslim religious minority,” compared to 
minorities who “strictly comply with and fit 
absolutely in the Burmese-constructed 
ideals, belief and identity.”51 Even 
disregarding acts of violence against the 
Rohingya, their rejection from the state has 
led to restrictions on travel, marriage, 
birthing rates, and freedom of religion.52 The 
Rohingya are not the only minority group to 
face discrimination in Burma; the UN has 
investigated the Tatmadaw for violence 
against groups including the Shan, Kachin, 
Karen, and Chin53 (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Image by Author In 2018, I briefly visited the 
city of Tachileik in Burma’s Shan State while studying abroad in 
Thailand. The Shan battle for independence is another example of 
ethnic conflict in Burma. 
 
However, while there are multiple 
ethnic conflicts ongoing in Burma, the 
campaign against the Rohingya has been the 
most systematic.54 A 1988 regime document 
recently uncovered by the International State 
Crime Institute exposed a long term plan for 
eradication of the Rohingya, with steps 
including forbidding land ownership and 
finding the Rohingya at fault in all court 
cases—but avoiding mass killing “in order 
not to invite the attention of the Muslim 
countries.”55 This document embodies one 
of the main established causes of the current 
crisis: discrimination against the Rohingya 
is deeply rooted in laws and practices under 
the military regime, and the Tatmadaw has 
simply been waiting for an excuse “to totally 
wipe them out from Rakhine.”56 The extent 
to which the ethnic conflict is civilian as 
well as military based is debated; for 
example, there is deep animosity between 
Rakhine and Rohingya locals, but at least 
part of this resentment may be attributed to 
manipulation by the Tatmadaw in turning 
the groups against each other.57 
 Beyond ethnic discrimination, 
religious discrimination is pertinent to this 
crisis. Islamophobia is common among 
many Burmese Buddhists, and Rakhine 
7
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state’s location bordering Muslim 
Bangladesh makes some consider it the 
“‘western gate’... the last line of defence 
protecting the pure, Theravadda Buddhism” 
of Burma from Islam.58 Some Buddhists 
hold the view that, “If the gate breaks, the 
tens of millions of Muslims from Bengal 
will overrun not only Myanmar but also 
mainland Southeast Asia, much as is 
narrated to have occurred centuries ago in 
island Southeast Asia.”59  
 Nobody disputes that a long history 
of ethnic and religious discrimination 
against the Rohingya underlies the latest 
violent campaign against them. What is less 
certain however, is the specific events that 
triggered the unprecedented bloodshed of 
the past decade. Waves of violence have hit 
Rakhine State before, but recent years are 
distinct in their display of “undeterred 
propagation of hate speech coupled with 
clear political coordination.”60 One theory is 
that the democratic reopening triggered the 
violence. The most recent Constitution, 
written in 2008, “is notable for the degree to 
which it has not only conjoined the state and 
national races lexically but also 
institutionally.”61 The Constitution 
emphasized the idea of “taingyintha,” or 
“national races” of Burma, and suggested 
that belonging to one of the recognized races 
was of even greater importance than 
citizenship.62 The Constitution frames 
taingyintha as creating a “mythic unity that 
has never emerged and could be read as a 
defiant repudiation of ethnic diversity.”63  
 In addition to constitutional changes, 
when the military junta lifted limits on free 
expression and assembly in 2011, it allowed 
for a wave of populist mobilization where 
“deep, pent-up societal division and hatred, 
which was repressed by authoritarian rule” 
was unleashed by the democratization 
process.64 Two Buddhist extremist groups 
emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 
transition: the “969 Movement” and “Ma-
Ba-Tha,” both of which have been tolerated 
and even promoted by the government.65 
Many westerners consider Buddhism a 
pacifist religion; however, certain monks are 
at the forefront of the violence. For example, 
U Wirathu, the monk leader of the 969 
movement, was called the “Face of Buddhist 
Terror” by Time magazine in 2013.66 These 
extremist groups successfully campaigned 
the government to revoke the Rohingya’s 
temporary registration certificates in 2015 
and have spewed hate speech, including 
calling Islam “a faith of animals with 
uncontrollable birthrates."67 Additionally, 
fearmongering and discrimination have 
become campaign tools in the era of 
democracy, and both “hardliners and so-
called reformists find incentives in being 
complicit in the anti-Muslim conflicts.”68 
Thus, while democratic developments in 
Burma over the past decade promised 
reform from the years of junta control, they 
may in fact have helped incite the conflict in 
Rakhine State by releasing “hard-core and 
deeply felt grievances about Buddhism 
being under siege from the forces of 
modernity, globalism and Islam.”69  
 A final factor commonly cited as 
amplifying the violence is the use of social 
media in Burma. In Burma, Facebook is so 
widely used by the country’s 18 million 
internet users that it is often equated with the 
internet itself.70 In 2018, a New York Times 
investigation revealed that not only were 
extremist groups using Facebook to disperse 
hate speech, but the military itself was 
behind turning “the social network into a 
tool for ethnic cleansing.”71 Military 
personnel created fake accounts and flooded 
them with hate speech, including posting 
pictures of corpses they said were evidence 
of massacres by the Rohingya, and stated 
that Muslim attacks were imminent.72 
Facebook took down accounts after the 
investigation revealed ties to the military but 
received criticism for its response and 
8
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commitment to preventing similar situations 
in the future.73 The internet provides a 
means of propaganda beyond anything in the 
past, and the systematic use of it by 
extremists and the military to instigate 
violence contributed to the crisis’ outbreak 
and intensity.  
 
Environmental Factors in Burma  
With an understanding of the prevailing 
causal theories, environmental factors in 
Burma can be discussed. The environment 
has long been studied as a “threat 
multiplier” for existing conflicts.74 Thomas 
F. Homer-Dixon writes that environmental 
scarcity “can contribute to civil violence, 
including insurgencies and ethnic clashes.”75 
However, its role is rarely direct, rather 
interacting with other factors to produce 
violence, and therefore analysts often 
overlook scarcity’s role in flaring underlying 
stress and instead interpret economic, social, 
or political factors as the principal cause.76 
An example of interaction between social 
and environmental factors is “resource 
capture,” when dominant groups within a 
society “shift resource distribution in their 
favor.” 77 Moreover, environmental scarcity 
may strengthen group identities based on 
ethnic, class, or religious affiliations in a 
process known as social segmentation, as 
groups face intensified competitive for 
resources.78 
While the role of resource scarcity in 
conflict is far from new, climate change, 
population growth, and economic 
development are expected to increase the 
prevalence of these circumstances.79 
Through catastrophic weather events, 
climate change, “will lead to new or more 
intense resource scarcities, which, in turn, 
will trigger more intense competition and 
conflict between states and local 
communities sharing common resources.”80  
 This existing framework for the role 
of environmental scarcity and natural 
disasters in fueling conflict evokes the 
situation in Burma, which faces an 
increasingly vulnerable environmental state. 
A 2019 World Bank report concluded that 
Burma’s ecosystems, fisheries, and forestry 
are under “tremendous pressure.”81 Burma’s 
marine fish resources have declined as much 
as 90 percent since 1980, forest cover has 
declined by 10 million hectares since 1990, 
and urban waste, mining discharge, and air 
quality are all deteriorating as well.82  
As Burma relies heavily on natural 
resource exploitation for economic 
development, environmental degradation 
affects not only the natural world and human 
health, but economic prosperity. Seventy 
percent of the labor force is employed in 
agriculture, accounting for 37.8 percent of 
GDP.83 The government has prioritized 
short-term profit over long-term 
sustainability, with slash-and-burn and 
industrial agriculture methods promoted.84 
Burma’s policies hostile to sustainable 
changes “can force the cultivation systems 
into suboptimal practices … or obstruct 
them altogether, leading to poverty and 
conflict, alienating cultivators and leading to 
degraded land.” 85 Climate change will 
compound this threat, with the FAO finding 
that Burma is “highly vulnerable to climate 
change and extreme weather conditions,” 
with significant risk for agricultural 
production and food insecurity. 86 The FAO 
and World Bank call for sustainable policy 
approaches to prevent a worse-case scenario. 
 Unfortunately, a different kind of 
worse-case scenario is already facing 
Rakhine State. Rakhine State is one of the 
most resource-rich parts of the country, 
despite being one of the poorest 
economically.87 However, recent efforts aim 
to tap into the region’s potential. For 
example, between 2000 and 2014, Rakhine 
state lost more mangrove forest cover than 
9
et al.: Volume 4, Issue 1




Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2021 10 
any other state in Burma, causing an 
estimated ecosystem value loss of $946.87 
million per year due to damages to fisheries 
and habitat.88 When resource-rich Rakhine 
state is contrasted to conditions in Burma’s 
central states, where the populous regions of 
Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing display 
existing land degradation due to problems 
with erosion, desertification, salinization, 
and deforestation,89 the question is raised: 
does the recent exploitation of Rakhine 
state’s resources constitute a “resource 
capture” scenario as conditions deteriorate 
in primarily Burman states?  
Burma’s “Agenda 21” plan for 
sustainable development, a document 
submitted to the U.N., even hints at this 
intention. In it, programs for “the 
development of border areas and national 
races” and reclaiming “cultivable 
wastelands” are described.90 This reference 
to taingyintha is alarming within a 
sustainable development plan, and the plan 
may be coming to fruition. In the midst of 
the Rohingya crisis, the government 
announced that Rakhine state would be 
transformed into a business hub, and 
countries including Japan and Korea have 
already invested in the state.91 A.K.M Ahsan 
Ullah and Diotima Chattoraj claim that to 
implement this development plan, “the 
government needed to wipe out Rohingya 
from their homeland.”  
New York Times reporters in Rakhine 
state in 2019 witnessed this development in 
action.92 The reporters noted “infrastructure 
development in Rakhine: new power 
stations, government buildings and, most of 
all, military and border guard bases ... built 
on land emptied by ethnic cleansing,” and 
found that Buddhists had taken over 
Rohingya businesses, that the military 
continues to raze Muslim villages, and that 
the companies responsible for the building 
boom were “cronies of the military.” 93  
Rakhine state is not the only ethnic 
minority state in Burma where resources 
have been seized by the Tatmadaw. For 
example, in Kachin state, “resource 
extraction has provided incentive and 
financing” for the Tatmadaw and the Kachin 
Independence Organization (KIO) to keep 
fighting in a state rich with precious stones 
and minerals.94 In Karen state, the 
Tatmadaw has used “intimidation and 
coercion to seize land and displace local 
people” in an area that is appealing for 
tourism, extractive, and agriculture 
industries.95 
If the Tatmadaw are similarly 
pursuing resource gains in Rakhine state, 
who stands to benefit? While the 
government was known to enlist “Rakhine 
Buddhist fundamentalists to safeguard their 
interests in the resource-rich state,”96 the 
Tatmadaw’s own ongoing conflict with the 
Arakan Army calls to attention that in other 
ethnic regions facing conflict in Burma, 
“armed groups have often been manipulated 
against each other, weakening their military 
capabilities, and often causing them to lose 
control of their natural resources.”97 This 
raises the possibility that both ethnic 
minorities, Rohingya and Rakhine, could be 
excluded from any Tatmadaw development 
plan in favor of enriching the military’s own 
pockets or benefitting solely the Burman 
majority. 
In addition to this development plan, 
specific environmental events may have 
fueled the crisis; in particular, the aftermath 
of Cyclone Nargis had secondary effects on 
the Rakhine region. On May 2, 2008, 
Cyclone Nargis struck Burma’s Irrawaddy 
Delta, located primarily in Ayeyarwady 
Region bordering Rakhine State.98 
Approximately 140,000 people were killed, 
making it the worst natural disaster in 
Burmese history.99 The cyclone additionally 
destroyed much of Burma’s rice crop, as the 
Irrawaddy Delta was one of the primary 
10
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regions of production, and saline water from 
storm surge contaminated about one million 
acres of cropland.100 This caused severe 
food shortages and high prices, with one 
analyst predicting that due to “the historical 
connection between rice shortages and 
popular unrest … the cycle of explosive 
protest and regime crackdowns is likely to 
continue.”101 While Cyclone Nargis is the 
most severe example, other natural disasters 
such as 2010’s Cyclone Giri and 2017’s 
Cyclone Mora also worsened conditions. 
Cyclone Giri destroyed an estimated 97, 125 
hectares of farmland in Rakhine State,102 
and Cyclone Mora—which hit the region 
after the refugee crisis began—tore through 
refugee camps. These natural disasters likely 
had a destabilizing effect on the region and 
intensified competition for resources.  
The evidence in Burma of 
environmental scarcity, resource capture in 
ethnic regions, and devastating natural 
disasters aligns with the existing framework 
for how environmental stress may fuel 
violence, particularly as a threat multiplier 
on top of deep-rooted social and political 
elements. To further explore this claim, this 
crisis can be compared to another where 
environmental factors are frequently cited as 
playing a role: Sudan.  
 
Comparative Case Study: Sudan  
While the decades-long conflict in Sudan 
(and now South Sudan) began as an ethno-
religious civil war between the 
predominantly Arab Muslim north and the 
African Christian south, the war has grown 
in layers of complexity over the years, and 
now environmental factors including 
drought and desertification are commonly 
recognized as exacerbating the violence.103 
Sudan gained independence from Britain in 
1956, and like many other postcolonial 
states, Sudan was left with few routes to 
economic development beyond its natural 
resources.104 An overconcentration of people 
in central Sudan led to severe degradation 
and overexploitation of the region, 
contributing “to intensifying ethnic 
hostilities and competition for limited 
resources.”105 Additionally, this motivated 
the northern-based government to drive 
southward to extract natural resources, 
jeopardizing the livelihoods of southern 
citizens and contributing to the formation of 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in 
present-day South Sudan.106 While violence 
in Sudan is still best characterized as an 
ethno-religious conflict, “eco-conflicts have 
clearly protracted the Sudanese war” as 
advantaged groups monopolize resources at 
the expense of the majority, resulting “in 
environmental destruction, economic 
decline, social disintegration, population 
displacement, and protracted conflict.107  
 How well does Sudan’s situation 
align with Burma’s? In both cases (see 
Figure 3 for a comparative flowchart) a 
former British colony with extreme ethnic 
and religious diversity was left with few 
tools for survival beyond natural resource 
use. For both countries, this led to 
overexploitation of resources in the 
central/majority-group-controlled regions, 
causing a drive for development in minority 
regions. Finally, in Sudan and Burma, these 
drives for development were followed by 
waves of intense violence within a longer 
history of conflict. However, there are some 
differences. For one, environmental pressure 
in Sudan is more severe, with a 2007 U.N. 
Environmental Programme report declaring 
that the scale of climate change was “almost 
unprecedented: the reduction in rainfall has 
turned millions of hectares of already 
marginal semi-desert grazing land into 
desert.”108 In comparison, Burma is in “a 
region less vulnerable to desertification,” 
although aforementioned issues including 
soil erosion, salinization, soil fertility 
depletion, and alkalinization affect about 17 
11
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percent of the country, primarily in the 
central regions.109 Another difference 
between Sudan and Burma is the presence of 
climate migration. In Sudan, drought, 
desertification, and flooding are direct 
causes of migration and internal 
displacement, as these issues force people to 
seek more arable land.110 In Burma, there is 
little evidence that environmental factors 
directly cause IDPs and climate refugees, 
but environmental pressure may intensify 
the conflicts that produce refugees. Finally, 
the role of natural disasters is different in 
these two countries: Burma is vulnerable to 
unpredictable, one-time events such as 
cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic 
eruptions, and landslides, whereas Sudan is 
more vulnerable to long-term events such as 
droughts. 
 
Figure 3: Infographic by Author 
 
 The case of Sudan helps exemplify 
how the Rohingya crisis fits the framework 
of a conflict with environmental layers, even 
if degradation in Burma is less severe than 
Sudan. While there is limited prior research 
on the role of environmental pressure in 
Burmese conflicts, there are clear 
similarities between Burma and Sudan 
where more scholarship on eco-conflict 
exists, thus displaying how a combination of 
ethnic tensions, unequal distribution of 
power, and resource scarcity fuels violence.  
 
Environmental Impacts of the Crisis 
Not only have environmental problems in 
Burma seemingly contributed to the past 
decade’s flare-up of violence against the 
Rohingya, but the crisis itself has impacted 
the environment. As of August 2019, more 
than 730,000 Rohingya refugees are living 
in the world’s largest refugee encampment 
in Bangladesh, a “teeming, squalid 
settlement” where landslides, rampaging 
elephants, and disease are common.111  
These camps put tremendous pressure on 
local ecosystems. About 4,300 acres of hills 
and forests were cut down to make shelters 
and to use as cooking fuel, and every month 
an additional nearly 6,800 tons of firewood 
are collected.112 This deforestation causes 
biodiversity loss and increases the risk of 
landslides.113 Additionally, air quality is 
declining as a result of increased vehicular 
traffic and smoke from cooking fires, and 
there are no long-term solutions for waste 
management including fecal matter and 
plastics.114 This has resulted in the 
contamination of already-limited water 
resources, with about 70 percent of 
groundwater samples in a 2017 study found 
to be heavily polluted.115 The poor 
environmental outlook for areas around the 
camps not only negatively impacts 
ecosystems and creates even worse 
conditions for the already suffering 
Rohingya, but risks additional conflict. A 
summary of physical impacts of the camps 
in a U.N. Development Programme report 
concluded that, “In particular the impacts on 
groundwater may give rise to significant 
social conflicts between the host 
communities and Rohingya over the use of 
water resources.”116  
 
Analysis of Causes 
Few, if any, conflicts are one-dimensional. 
Conflicts consist of “numerous root causes 
interacting or stimulating each other and 
12





Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2021 13 
finally escalating into the explosion … 
conflict is a process, not a fixed state of 
crisis.”117 In the case of Burma, the root 
causes of the Rohingya crisis are ethnic 
discrimination stemming from the British 
colonial era and religious discrimination 
intensified by the civilization “fault line” 
between Burma and Bangladesh. These root 
causes have resulted in systematic exclusion 
of the Rohingya from Burmese society, with 
a system of laws and policies denying them 
citizenship and basic rights. With this long 
history of exclusion, what factors incited the 
recent phase of violence, which peaked in 
2017? While prior scholarship primarily 
cites societal changes caused by the 2011 
democratic opening, the emergence of new 
Buddhist extremist groups, and propaganda 
efforts made possible by social media, 
increasing environmental pressure in Burma 
should be considered a factor as well.  
 In Burma, overreliance on natural 
resources, unsustainable government 
policies, and natural disasters including the 
devastating Cyclone Nargis have contributed 
to a situation of environmental stress, with 
the country’s ecosystems, fisheries, and 
forestry coming under tremendous 
pressure.118 One sign of this stress is land 
degradation in the populous central regions, 
and there is evidence that the Tatmadaw’s 
solution to securing resources (whether to 
fund its own operations or for the majority 
ethnic and religious groups) is to exploit 
resource-rich ethnic minority states. For 
instance, Burma’s Agenda 21 plan lists 
development of border areas and national 
races as a sustainable development 
program,119 and resource capture is evident 
within conflicts in both Karen120 and Kachin 
States.121 That a similar seizure—rather than 
pure ethnic conflict—is unfolding in 
Rakhine state is evidenced by a recent 
harvesting push in the region for resources 
such as mangroves and an announcement by 
the government after the “clearance 
operations” of 2017 that Rakhine State 
would be transformed into a business hub.122 
This infrastructure development on land 
cleared by ethnic cleansing, with Buddhists 
moving in where the Rohingya were killed 
or forced out, has been witnessed by 
reporters in the region.123  
 Therefore, while violence against the 
Rohingya is mired in deep ethnic and 
religious division, codified in discriminatory 
policies, and has been foreshadowed for 
decades—most explicitly by a regime 
document with a long-term eradication plan 
for the Rohingya—environmental scarcity in 
Burma fits the framework for eco-conflicts 
as an “aggravating cause in a highly 
complex, multicausal system.”124 The 
environmental layer likely not only interacts 
with the long-term causes of the crisis, but 
also with other inciting factors. For example, 
Homer-Dixon’s social segmentation process 
of heightened group identity in the face of 
resource competition may partially explain 
the emergence of players within the conflict 
such as Buddhist extremist groups or the 
Arakan army. Additionally, in the wake of 
the democratic opening, the Tatmadaw may 
have sought ways to strengthen itself after 
losing junta control, with lucrative foreign 
contracts for infrastructure development in 
ethnic regions a possible solution. And 
further, the Rohingya crisis’ own 
environmental impacts including degraded 
land, water, and air in areas around the 
refugee camps risk a circular effect of 
starting new conflict with the host 
community. These are examples of the ways 
in which environmental factors may weave 
throughout a conflict to inspire new points 
of tension or exacerbate existing ones. 
While “because the relationship between 
environmental scarcity and contextual 
factors is interactive, it is often impossible to 
determine the relative weight or power of 
environmental scarcity as a cause of 
violence in specific cases,” the evidence in 
13
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Burma leads to the conclusion that 
environmental factors must be considered 




The Rohingya crisis is often called a 
hopeless one. While in April 2018, Burma 
agreed to begin “voluntary and dignified 
repatriations,” almost no Rohingya have 
returned.125 The Rohingya are terrified to 
return to the site of mass killings, and 
Burmese officials still fail to even recognize 
them as a distinct ethnic group, much less 
citizens.126 The September 2019 UNHRC 
factfinding mission on Burma found that 
there is a serious risk of genocidal actions 
recurring, and that it is impossible for the 
Rohingya to return in current conditions.127 
Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi government, 
struggling with overpopulation and poverty, 
is under pressure from its citizens to ensure 
that funds are not diverted to refugees, who 
have not been given official refugee status to 
ensure their placement is not permanent.128  
 General recommendations for 
addressing this conflict include repealing the 
1982 Citizenship Law and offering an 
accessible path to citizenship for the 
Rohingya.129 Additionally, Burma should 
close its internal camps housing Rohingya 
and provide them with adequate land and 
freedom of movement.130 The UNHRC does 
not recommend returning refugees located in 
Bangladesh to Burma until adequate 
provisions for their protection exist.131 
International acts such as prosecuting Burma 
for crimes against humanity, severing 
relations between the international 
community and the Tatmadaw, and 
instituting sanctions to prevent the flow of 
arms and other military equipment into the 
country may pressure the government into 
action. The UN factfinding mission on 
Myanmar listed 14 known international 
suppliers of arms to Burma, which included 
companies based in China, Russia, India, 
and Singapore (see figure 4 for a chart of 
suppliers132). However, the practical 
limitations of these recommendations must 
be acknowledged, particularly in light of the 
February 2021 coup when the Tatmadaw 
regained control of the government. Despite 
being alienated from much of the global 
community and with genocide proceedings 
ongoing in the International Court of Justice, 
the Tatmadaw has only doubled down on 
suppression—not just for ethnic minorities, 
but all opposition.133 In a country where 
officials still claim “‘Rohingya’ is not 
real,”134 a better future within Burma’s 




Figure 4: Infographic on arms and military 
equipment suppliers to Burma 
 
 Recommendations specific to 
environmental causes begin with addressing 
the underlying degradation. As Homer-
Dixon writes, “if severe environmental 
damage becomes irreversible, it can become 
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a permanent source of social stress; even if 
the political and economic factors that 
originally produced the damage are 
fixed.”135 Between continued 
overexploitation of resources, population 
growth, and the accelerating threat of 
climate change, Burma must take action 
now to prevent permanent harm to the land 
and resources its people depend upon for 
survival. Actions such as restoring 
productivity to land through sustainable 
agriculture methods, diversifying crops, 
combating illegal logging and poaching, and 
improving urban conditions through waste 
management and air pollution projects can 
help improve Burma’s environmental status. 
Additionally, Burma should move away 
from a largely natural resource-based 
economy as outlined in the country’s 
Sustainable Development Plan. However, 
development projects must benefit all 
residents; specifically in Rakhine state, 
development programs “should take the 
necessary steps to ensure that their actions, 
first, do not enrich the Tatmadaw and, 
second, are of benefit to all the ethnic 
communities of Rakhine State on the basis 
of equality.”136 By addressing underlying 
environmental degradation, curbing climate 
change, and developing sustainably and 
inclusively, environmental issues could 
move far down the long list of factors 
causing conflict in Burma. Additionally, to 
prevent the degradation caused by refugee 
camps from perhaps fueling more violence, 
international aid should be directed to 
refugees to supply resources such as 
alternative fuel options and safe drinking 
water. Whether in a Bangladeshi camp or in 
the central regions of Burma, unmitigated 
deterioration of environmental conditions 
can only be expected to increase tensions in 
the region, possibly leading to further social 
segmentation, resource capture, and 
violence.     
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, environmental degradation in 
Burma has been examined as a factor in the 
ongoing Rohingya crisis. While the root 
causes of this conflict are long-term and 
systematic ethnic and religious 
discrimination, Burma’s declining 
environmental status should be considered 
alongside the fallout of the 2011 democratic 
opening, a wave of Buddhist extremism, and 
propaganda spread through social media as 
an inciting factor. Limited prior research 
exists on the Rohingya crisis as an eco-
conflict; however, through examining the 
location and extent of degradation and 
natural disasters in Burma, the government’s 
stated plans for development, and the 
current situation in Rakhine State, a portrait 
of the environmental layers of the crisis can 
be painted. Additionally, the situation in 
Burma can be placed within the existing 
framework for the role of environmental 
scarcity in ethno-religious conflicts, with the 
Tatmadaw’s actions in ethnic regions of 
Burma aligning with the concept of resource 
capture and showing how competition may 
contribute to social segmentation. Finally, a 
comparative case-study to conflict in Sudan 
sheds light on how while “environmental 
stress results in violent conflict only when 
interacting with other political, ethnic, 
economic, and social causes,”137 (Lee, 
1997), in both Burma and Sudan, resource 
scarcity and inequality led to worsening 
violence along existing fault lines. With few 
signs that Burma will soon turn to more 
sustainable resource use, and with climate 
change certain to aggravate natural disasters 
and land quality issues, action needs to be 
taken now to prevent the intensification of 
conflict in an already conflict-ridden 
country. The situation of the Rohingya in 
Burma provides further warning for other 
countries facing upheaval in how 
environmental stress may lace itself through 
15
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fracture points—a warning that must be 
heeded as environmental threats accelerate 
and intensify worldwide.  
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Neocolonial Discourse 





NICOLE E. WOOD 
 
Abstract 
For those familiar with the field of 
international development, the Peace Corps 
has become a well-recognized source of 
American aid, service, and intercultural 
relationships. While many would call Peace 
Corps service honorable, it is important to 
recognize the agency’s roots in 
neocolonialism. As I demonstrate in this 
article, the Peace Corps was established so 
that the United States could interfere in the 
self-determination of foreign countries, 
influence their development, and ensure the 
creation of Western democratic and 
capitalistic structures worldwide—all under 
the guise of altruistic aid. My challenge for 
the Peace Corps is the following: in order 
for the agency to continue promoting the 
peace, sustainable change, and intercultural 
relationships it prides itself on, the Peace 
Corps has to reckon with its intentionally 
deceitful past, neocolonial structure, and 
current position as a federal entity exerting 
power in developing countries around the 
world. 
First, I provide some background 
information about the Peace Corps, their 
goals, and their model of service. Then, in 
Section 2, I discuss the historical context of 
the Peace Corps’ establishment and reveal 
how colonial rhetoric was used to justify a 
need for the agency. I do this by exploring 
the “East vs. West” divide in development 
discourse through an application of Edward 
Said’s “Orientalism” theory. Next, I uncover 
how notions of Western superiority 
furthered neocolonialism by drawing upon 
the concept of “positional superiority,” 
which Michael Latham discusses in his book 
Modernization as Ideology. In the fourth 
section, I demonstrate how racist and 
ethnocentric ideologies have shaped the 
Peace Corps narrative. 
In Section 5, I examine current Peace 
Corps values by reviewing agency training 
materials and the work of their Intercultural 
Competency, Diversity and Inclusion 
(ICD&I) Team. Here, I highlight how the 
Peace Corps is promoting equitable 
relationships through improved intercultural 
training and from an application of 
“postcolonial self-reflexivity”—a theory 
covered by Jenna Hanchey, a returned Peace 
Corps volunteer. Finally, I provide an 
overall analysis of the agency, detailing 
three negative aspects of its structure I 
believe pose the biggest challenges, as the 
issues pertain directly to neocolonial 
development work, equitable partnerships 
and intercultural relationships. 
Ultimately, I argue no amount of 
intercultural awareness, sensitivity training, 
or integration measures can override the 
“positional superiority” that the Peace Corps 
benefits from as a U.S. government entity. 
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Only when one considers the agency’s 
neocolonial roots, their unwillingness to 
change problematic aspects of their 
structure, and the Eurocentric notion that is 
“development”, can the problem be fully 
realized. I argue true equity between the 
Peace Corps and the countries it serves 
cannot be attained until the agency separates 
itself from the U.S. government, hires only 
technically-skilled applicants, and begins 
incorporating more host country national 
leadership into their grassroots work. 
 
Brief Peace Corps Overview 
Founded in 1961 by President John 
F. Kennedy, the Peace Corps (PC) serves to 
work alongside developing countries and 
provide them with trained volunteers in 
sectors of agriculture, community economic 
development, education, environment, 
health, and youth development. Peace Corps 
volunteers live abroad for a total of 27 
months as they work on community-level 
projects designed to “modernize” and 
“elevate” developing host nations—projects 
that, for example, improve literacy rates, 
lower child mortality rates, and increase 
sustainable farming practices.1 
Prior to service, volunteers undergo 
10-12 weeks of pre-service training that 
equips them to work in their sector, teaches 
them the language(s) spoken at site, and 
provides cultural context to prepare them for 
life in their host country 1\. During service, 
volunteers are paired with local civilian 
counterparts who help volunteers address 
their communities’ needs (GAO 1990, 48). 
The three goals of the Peace Corps are to 
provide countries with trained assistance, for 
volunteers to represent the United States and 
American culture, and for volunteers to 
learn about their host countries.2 This 
mutual exchange of practices, norms and 
values is an integral part of Peace Corps 
service and the knowledge volunteers bring 
back to the U.S. after their service is said to 
benefit the whole U.S. population by 
promoting a better understanding of cultures 
around the world.2 
 
Historical Context 
In order to understand why the Peace 
Corps was created in 1961, one must 
recognize the historical context of the Cold 
War and the United States’ perspective 
going into it. Following World War II, 
communism in the Soviet Union posed the 
next great danger to American society. This 
intangible threat of communist ideology, and 
the goal of ultimately containing it, became 
the United States’ main concern leading into 
the Cold War. 
No president better exemplified anti-
communist rhetoric and liberal “Western” 
ideals than the young John F. Kennedy. 
Upon being elected to office in 1961, 
Kennedy put forth a comprehensive 
containment plan to focus on periphery 
regions around the Soviet Union, rather than 
interfering directly with the superpower3. 
The Kennedy Administration saw young, 
emerging countries in “the East” as 
opportunities for the United States to 
suppress the spread of communism and 
ensure the establishment of Western 
political and economic structures in the 
U.S.’ own image. Kennedy’s foreign policy 
advisors believed that developing countries 
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“lacked the type of integrative values that 
theorists identified with […] stable, Western 
democracies,” making them “extremely 
vulnerable to communism and its seductive 
claims of social reform, political order, and 
economic growth”.4 
This language is nearly identical to 
that used by British colonist Arthur James 
Balfour, in his 1910 address to the British 
House of Commons, famously critiqued in 
Edward Said’s Orientalism.5 “Orientalism,” 
as Said describes, “is the ineradicable 
distinction between Western superiority and 
Oriental inferiority. [It is] a political version 
of reality whose structure promoted the 
difference between the familiar (Europe, the 
West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the 
East, ‘them’)”. 5 An early proponent of the 
“Orientalism” theory, Balfour defends 
British colonization and occupation in 
“Oriental” countries by stating “the facts of 
the case” 5: Western nations as soon as they 
emerge into history show the beginnings of 
those capacities for self[-]government 
having merits of their own… You may look 
through the whole history of the Orientals in 
what is called, broadly speaking, the East, 
and you never find traces of self-
government. […] never in all the revolutions 
of fate and fortune have you seen one of 
those nations of its own motion establish 
what we, from a Western point of view, call 
self-government. 5 
Balfour does a number of things in 
his assertion. First, he divides the world in 
half by distinguishing a strong binary 
between the “East” and “West”. Second, he 
associates “the West” with moral prowess 
and leadership, while labeling the less-
developed “East” as incapable. Lastly, 
Balfour reduces the historical, cultural, and 
political achievements of Egypt to nothing 
more than a country deserving of foreign 
domination. This condescending attitude 
fueled imperialistic practices, as it 
empowered Western nations to colonize and 
exploit developing countries and rebuild 
according to their own ideals. Sadly, these 
processes persist today, although no longer 
demonstrated through physical military 
imposition as it was in earlier centuries. 
Instead, many Western countries continue to 
exercise influence over parts of the world 
through economic, political, and social 
pressures—practices known as 
neocolonialism. 
This type of neocolonialist discourse 
was present in the Kennedy Administration 
during the early 1960s. Walt Whitman 
Rostow, one of Kennedy’s top economic 
advisors, argued the new challenge for U.S. 
foreign policy “was to disguise development 
in a way that was desirable for those who 
had previously been under colonial rule”.6 
Rostow recognized that America needed to 
create a model of development that stressed 
“national liberation” and economic 
independence in order to entice newly-
independent countries away from 
communist ideals. 6 
By reiterating Balfour’s belief that 
developing countries were incapable of self-
governance, the Kennedy Administration 
wished to extend American “assistance” 
overseas to subtly exercise control over 
periphery states in the East. This sense of 
American authority comes from the belief 
that the American experience (its colonial 
history yet subsequent rise to power) is 
exceptional—a belief that “establish[ed] a 
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polarity between the United States and the 
rest of the world”.7 This exceptionalism was 
reinforced after World War II, when the 
U.S. began exercising a more dominant 
presence around the world and in “the 
Orient”—a feat historically reserved for 
European powers (Said 2003, 11-12). In 
doing so, the United States solidified its 
position as a fully-developed, Western 
country and began to apply this sense of 
entitlement to its relations with the Eastern 
world. 
This East/West dichotomy equated 
terms like “development” and “progress” 
with American notions of democracy, 
capitalism, and equality, while 
“undeveloped” and “traditional” societies 
elsewhere became synonymous with the 
opposite—thus implying they were prime 
targets for communist infestation. Here, it is 
clear how notions of development were (and 
continue to be) based on European societal 
values and disadvantages other ways of 
measuring life, health, economy, and 
happiness. This divide in development 
theory still exists today, though terms like 
“First vs. Third World” and “Global North 
vs. South” more commonly refer to the 
divide. 7 By equipping this rhetoric and 
framing intervention as rescuing “backward 
societies” from communist ruin, America 
could defend its own international meddling 
through neocolonial tactics. 6 With this in 
mind, Kennedy established the two most 
recognizable U.S. development agencies 
within the first few months of his 
presidency—the Peace Corps and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development—
both with the intention of preventing the 
spread of communism. In doing so, the 
Peace Corps provided a “friendlier, more 
casual alternative” to diplomacy, thus 
making it an ideal neocolonial cover for the 
United States’ political, economic, social, 
and ideological overhaul in developing 
nations. 6 
 
Neocolonial Rhetoric in Early Peace 
Corps History 
Neocolonial discourse was heard by 
the American public in 1961, when 
President Kennedy proudly declared at his 
inauguration, “To those peoples in the huts 
and villages of half the globe struggling to 
break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge 
our best efforts to help them help 
themselves, for whatever period is required” 
(“Inaugural Address”). This reinforced the 
East/West divide and labelled people in 
developing countries as “helpless” by 
asserting that they lack the necessary tools 
to “help themselves”. It also implied that 
“unless something American is brought in 
[or] unless Americans use their 
exceptionality to empower, […] the [other] 
culture will remain static”. 8 In this course of 
action, the Peace Corps was established to 
“save” people in the East from their “huts 
and villages” and to provide them with the 
same opportunities, resources, and freedoms 
Americans enjoyed in the West. 
Though portrayed as purely 
altruistic, Peace Corps methods of “helping 
others” operated within and perpetuated 
power differentials—a structure in which the 
United States had “positional superiority”. 9 
This “positional superiority” situated the 
U.S. on top, followed closely by European 
hegemons, with the rest of the “developing 
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world” trailing below. This hierarchy of 
power fit right into Kennedy’s early 
development theories. Walt Whitman 
Rostow once famously said that “the 
development of nations is a little like the 
development of human beings,” suggesting 
“a mature, advanced society could take the 
hands of wayward, childlike ones and guide 
them into the adulthood of modernity”. 9 By 
comparing newly independent countries to 
helpless children in need of care from older, 
more established democratic nations, 
Rostow asserted that development could not 
occur without Western guidance and 
influence. 
This echoes Edward Said’s analysis 
of the Oriental-European relationship. To 
quote Said, the key “feature of [these] 
relations was that Europe was always in a 
position of strength [...] True, the 
relationship of strong to weak could be 
disguised or mitigated […] but the essential 
relationship [would always be] between a 
strong and weak partner”.10 By attempting to 
“disguise” and “mitigate” American 
influence through development, the United 
States was able to justify self-asserting itself 
into the affairs of developing countries in an 
effort to modernize them. 
In truth, this process of 
modernization was simply “a means for the 
continued assertion of the privileges and 
rights of [the] dominant power” onto a 
colonized people.9 By placing Peace Corps 
volunteers in countries with colonial 
histories, it was easy for the U.S. to use 
neocolonial tactics to encourage their 
dependency. This is where the process is 
intentionally deceitful. “In order to make 
[neocolonialism] attractive to those upon 
whom it is practised it must be shown as 
capable of raising their living standards,” 
however, the ultimate “economic objective 
of neo-colonialism is to keep those standards 
depressed in the interest of the developed 
countries. It is only when this contradiction 
is understood that the failure of innumerable 
‘aid’ programmes [...] can be explained” 
(Nkrumah 1966, xv). In this way, the United 
States was able to demonstrate a public 
“commit[ment] to self-determination for 
all”, while using the Peace Corps to 
reinforce relationships of dependency 
around the world. 11 
 
Ethnocentric Arrogance Within the 
Peace Corps 
It was President Kennedy’s “help 
them help themselves” declaration in 1961 
that best exemplified the problem in 
international development. While it 
appeared noble on the surface, his statement 
perpetuated the East/West divide and 
equipped patronizing phrasing that has 
propelled the field of development for years. 
With his statement, Kennedy placed the duty 
of assistance on American citizens—
essentially creating a 20th century equivalent 
to the “White Man’s Burden”. Named after 
the poem by Rudyard Kipling, the “White 
Man’s Burden” concept “assumes the 
American as the standard of perfection” and 
states that those with this privilege must 
help the “Other to develop both 
economically and culturally” in order to 
share their liberties and freedoms.12 For the 
Peace Corps, this “Burden” is “coupled with 
the idea of American exceptionalism” and 
applied within the Eurocentric framework of 
27
et al.: Volume 4, Issue 1






Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2021 28 
development, making it additionally 
problematic. 12 As a result, Kennedy’s 
promise of mobilizing Americans to “break 
the bonds of mass misery” sent the message 
that Americans had the inherent ability and 
responsibility to reduce the world’s 
inequities, reinforcing the belief that those in 
developing countries needed a savior. 13 
Though the term “White Savior 
Complex” wasn’t officially coined by Teju 
Cole until 2012, early PC rhetoric had been 
fully embodying this term since 1961. 14 Just 
like the “White Man’s Burden,” the “White 
Savior Complex” is demonstrated when 
white people (often those in Western 
countries) and set out to “save” others 
(predominantly people of color in less-
developed countries) that they have deemed 
less fortunate. Here, race is an important 
factor because it acknowledges that self-
righteous assumptions in development (for 
instance, the assumption others need your 
help and that the “world exists simply to 
satisfy the needs […] of white people”) are 
all deeply rooted in white supremacist 
ideologies. 15 
These racist and Eurocentric 
sentiments remain on full display in current 
Peace Corps materials. As former volunteer 
Michael Buckler points out, “a prime 
example” of the Peace Corps’ “hallmarks of 
saviorism” is the agency’s official motto: 
“Make the Most of Your World”. 16 “The 
message is clear: The world is yours, go 
forth and fix it”. 16 This phrasing literally 
tells American volunteers they are entitled to 
the world and when one considers how PC 
recruits are predominantly white, while host 
countries consist primarily of people of 
color, it reinforces notions of white 
supremacy. 17 This motto affirms the belief 
that any American, regardless of 
qualifications, can provide assistance to and 
“save” those in developing countries, simply 
because of their American privilege. 
These racial dynamics are 
entrenched within development work. Just 
as the East/West binary instilled a hierarchy 
between developed and developing 
countries, so too has an imbalance of power 
been established between white and non-
white people. As a result of years of 
conquest and colonization by white 
Europeans, “the West” has become 
synonymous with “white”, while places in 
“the East” are “Othered” and labeled “non-
white.” “This brings us back to the 
fundamental bias [that] Europeans 
conquered the world because their nature 
was predisposed to it, while non-Europeans 
were colonized because their nature 
condemned them to it”.18 “Racism appears, 
then, not as an incidental detail,” Albert 
Memmi writes, “but as a consubstantial part 
of colonialism”. 18 Because white supremacy 
plays a significant role in development 
theory, the “positional superiority” the U.S. 
benefits from is now dually compounded by 
race, as a majority-white nation. 
This intersection of power, 
nationalism, and race is consistent with the 
findings made by Jenna Hanchey, a returned 
Peace Corps volunteer who researched the 
impact of race and colonization on stories of 
service from former volunteers 19. In her 
graduate dissertation, Hanchey reveals “the 
intricate connection that postcolonial 
theoretical issues have to issues of race and 
ethnicity. Though colonialism should never 
be reduced to racism,” she writes, “the act is 
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intricately tied to race”. 19 These racial 
ideologies were not abandoned when 
physical, militaristic colonization was traded 
for more discreet neocolonial tactics. 
Instead, racism continues to be perpetuated 
within neocolonial development structures. 
Eurocentrism is another ideology 
upheld in the field of development. Similar 
to ethnocentrism, which judges one’s own 
cultural norms and values as the only 
“correct” or “moral” way to behave, 
Eurocentrism believes any behavior outside 
of European or Western norms “is wrong 
and misguided[,] that other cultures are 
decidedly inferior”. 20 This belief echoes all 
previous assertions made by Balfour and 
Rostow. Additionally, the interchangeability 
of “democratic values” and “capitalistic 
economies” with the developed “West” and 
opposite qualities with the undeveloped 
“East” allows one to conclude that the 
notion of “development” is inherently 
measured in Eurocentric ways. 
Despite its inextricable ties to 
development, Eurocentric behavior does 
clash with current PC goals of integration. 
By demonstrating these attitudes in service, 
volunteers risk offending their host 
communities, damaging local relationships, 
and being interpreted as elitist and narrow-
minded. Instead, it is crucial for volunteers 
to practice cultural relativity as they learn to 
integrate into their host communities and 
build positive intercultural relationships—
two markers of successful Peace Corps 
service. 20 
The first critique that identified this 
type of problematic behavior in Peace Corps 
service came in 1968, when Harvard 
University’s student-run newspaper 
published a scathing op-ed written by former 
volunteers. 21 The article read, “We now see 
that the Peace Corps is arrogant and 
colonialist in the same way as the 
government of which it is a part. […] It is a 
blindness produced by the arrogance of a 
nation that thinks itself capable of solving 
all the world’s problems with its own 
techniques”. 21 Here, former volunteers 
condemned the agency for perpetuating 
American superiority and admitted, that 
instead of “the antithesis [of] American 
colonialism” that Kennedy had promised, 
the Peace Corps truly was “imposing the 
United States’ political and cultural values” 
on developing countries through neocolonial 
means. 21 
Today, the Peace Corps has put more 
resources towards cultural sensitivity, 
intercultural communication, and 
integration, as they recognize effective 
service cannot occur without these skills. In 
the following section, I discuss how the 
agency has begun to address issues of 
American superiority, ethnocentrism, and 
racial ideologies through mandatory staff 
trainings that improve intercultural 
competency and address topics of equity, 
diversity, and inclusion. 
 
Present Discourse: Intercultural 
Competency, Diversity, and Inclusion 
I turn now to the current discourse 
within the agency to show how they are 
tackling ethnocentrism through improved 
intercultural training. To do so, I draw from 
their official cross-cultural workbook, 
Culture Matters, and assess two popular 
training models: the Self-Other Bridge and 
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Intercultural Code-Shifting. Here, I 
specifically highlight the Intercultural 
Competency, Diversity & Inclusion 
(ICD&I) Team for their work to identify 
workplace inequities, resolve conflict, and 
provide support to the international Peace 
Corps community. 
The ICD&I Team is part of the 
agency’s Office of Overseas Programming 
and Training Support (OPATS), which 
supervises the development, 
implementation, and evaluation of all Peace 
Corps training materials. In addition to 
addressing themes of diversity, the 
Intercultural Competency, Diversity & 
Inclusion Team also addresses common 
cross-cultural interactions that occur during 
service. These can include adjustment issues 
faced by volunteers, a lack of support for 
minority and/or marginalized Peace Corps 
staff, and communication setbacks between 
Americans and host country nationals. 22 
For three months prior to service, 
soon-to-be volunteers receive language, 
technical, and cross-cultural training in order 
to prepare them for service. During this 
period, each prospective volunteer receives a 
copy of the official PC cross-cultural 
workbook, Culture Matters, and begins to 
gain the skills necessary to navigate their 
new surroundings and the cultural 
differences that arise “between the volunteer 
and the people they’re working with”. 22 To 
aid the adjustment process and encourage 
best practices among volunteers, ICD&I 
specialists use two popular models within 
the field of intercultural communication: the 
Self-Other Bridge and Intercultural Code-
Shifting. 22 In a 2019 training webinar, 
ICD&I Specialists Emily Clawson and 
D’Lynn Jacobs explain these two models 
and apply them to common Peace Corps 
settings. 22 
First, the Self-Other Bridge Model 
requires the self-analysis of “one’s own 
reactions and worldview,” in addition to the 
consideration of others’ perspectives in a 
given scenario. 22 By asking oneself if 
adjustments could be made to achieve 
similar behaviors to others in the interaction, 
these strategies can help to “bridge” the 
“self-other” divide and create a more 
inclusive and equitable space (2019). While 
intercultural communication goes beyond 
simple verbal exchanges, language-learning 
is a common bridge method. This is an 
important bridging tool, as Albert Memmi 
points out, because “two tongues are in 
conflict” in places with colonial histories: 
“those of the colonizer and the colonized”. 23 
By using language to bridge the colonial 
power divide and communicate with others 
in their native tongue, volunteers often 
report better interactions and improved 
feelings of cultural adjustment. 22 
Jacobs, who also serves as the 
Director of Programming and Training in 
Vanuatu, finds that speaking the local 
language of Bislama is a “great way to 
develop effective and healthy relationships 
with [her] team,” earn their trust, and allow 
her coworkers to feel “valued” and “seen”. 
24 Clawson, a Supervisory ICD&I Specialist, 
agrees and says she always tries to “learn the 
basics of greeting people in their own 
language because that can allow me to […] 
create a space where it’s not just one group 
of people who always has to speak a 
language that’s not their first” (2019). 
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The second intercultural model PC 
uses is the Code-Shifting technique. 24 Code-
shifting refers to “intentionally modifying 
one’s own behavior to be appropriate and 
effective in a particular context” and often 
happens when one person recognizes a 
difference in engaging with another and 
alters their own approach in order to 
peacefully or more effectively interact with 
the other. 24 
It is important here to reiterate the 
role that power plays in international 
interactions. As stated throughout this paper, 
the Peace Corps wields a great deal of power 
in host countries as a U.S. government 
agency. Even with attempts to balance out 
this power, American volunteers and staff 
still benefit from this “positional 
superiority”—whether they are conscious of 
this dynamic or not. The problem that 
occurs, Clawson admits, is that HCN staff 
then constantly code-shift to fit American 
norms and make their American coworkers 
feel more comfortable (2019). Over time, it 
is not only exhausting for them to keep 
conforming to norms that are not their own, 
but it reinforces power inequities that stem 
from histories of colonization, imperialism, 
and racist ideologies like white supremacy. 
To best balance these power inequities, the 
Peace Corps has highlighted the “need for 
[volunteers] to code-shift culturally in 
relation to their own communities” and 
adapt to host culture norms, rather than the 
other way around. 24 
Both the Self-Other Bridge and 
Code-Shifting techniques require constant 
deliberate effort to be sensitive to cultural 
differences and to be aware of existing 
power dynamics. This is crucial, Clawson 
explains, because “when you’re aware of 
what’s going on, you can be intentional 
about the choices that you make” (2019). 
Jacobs echoes this, recognizing that by 
asking her staff to speak English during 
meetings instead of the local language of 
Bislama, “[I] would be leveraging my power 
as a U.S. American staff member, in this 
U.S. American organization, in their 
country”. 24 Instead, Jacobs finds that 
speaking the local language is “more 
appropriate for me to do my work and be 
equitable […] because this is the country in 
which we serve”. 24 
As demonstrated by these ICD&I 
Specialists, PC intercultural training requires 
a great deal of self-reflection, or as Hanchey 
calls it, “self-reflexivity”. “Self-reflexivity,” 
the former Peace Corps volunteer writes, 
“requires an acknowledgement and 
challenging of our own structures and 
structural ideologies”. 25Furthermore, 
Hanchey argues that a postcolonial approach 
is necessary when working in international 
development as it analyzes “the underlying 
Eurocentric assumptions of both one’s field 
and one’s own research, in order to root out 
‘latent ideological structures that inform our 
scholarship and practices’”. 26The damage, 
Hanchey claims, occurs when volunteers 
“perform the role of ‘development’ without 
bringing into question the global power 
differentials upon which development work 
is based”. 26 
Here, ICD&I Specialist Clawson 
demonstrates postcolonial self-reflexivity as 
she analyzes her own identity “as an 
English-speaking white woman” and 
position “in the facilitator space of 
privilege” when conducting ICD&I 
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workshops in host countries (Clawson 
2019). “When I’m going to countries that 
have a history of being colonized by 
English-speaking white people (or other 
white people), I think it’s really key to […] 
do that Self-Other Bridge process and ask 
myself, ‘what cultural norms am I 
privileging?’ [Do] I make everyone code 
shift to me or do I intentionally look for 
ways to honor a diversity of ways of being?” 
27 
By exemplifying the standards set in 
ICD&I practice, Clawson demonstrates how 
important it is to name the power structures 
present, recognize how one’s identity exists 
within those structures, and consider the 
perspectives of others in the interaction. 
This work from the Intercultural 
Competency, Diversity and Inclusion 
(ICD&I) Team demonstrates how the Peace 
Corps has been prioritizing better cross-
cultural training, intercultural 
communication, and awareness around 
power dynamics to create equitable and 
inclusive relationships. These ICD&I 
practices are incredibly impactful as they 
promote self-reflexivity and awareness on 
an individual level, while also ensuring the 
broader PC community shares a common 
vocabulary that reflects intercultural 
competency standards. 27 That said, I argue 
intercultural training is not enough to 
neutralize the systemic damage caused by 
the agency, or enough to alleviate the 
“positional superiority” the Peace Corps 
benefits from as an extension of the U.S. 
government working to develop the 
international community. 
 
Overall Agency Analysis: Three 
Structural Issues to Address 
In this section, I reiterate how the 
Peace Corps is perpetuating harm by 
analyzing three structural issues within its 
framework that must be addressed. First, I 
examine the lack of accountability offered 
by the agency as a result of its position 
within the U.S. government. Second, I 
explore the organization’s affinity for hiring 
unqualified applicants, which perpetuates 
issues of Western superiority, American 
exceptionalism, and white saviorism. Third, 
I question the agency’s failure to provide 
proper support or compensation to host 
country staff, as well as notice the lack of 
local involvement in Peace Corps countries. 
In each of these three sections, I propose 
possible solutions to combat these structural 
deficiencies and draw from outside 
scholarship and critiques for support. 
 
Structural Issue #1: PC’s Position as a 
U.S. Government Entity 
The biggest problem facing the 
Peace Corps and its future, I argue, is the 
agency’s own position as a part of the 
United States government. The Peace Corps’ 
close ties to the U.S. government has helped 
solidify its “positional superiority” in the 
field of international development and the 
power that accompanies this privilege—no 
matter how “nonlegitimate” the privilege 
is—has affected every aspect of the agency, 
including each intercultural interaction made 
by those in service. 28 This power has also 
prevented the organization from taking true 
accountability for the harm it has caused, 
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whether through deceptive neocolonial 
tactics, the imposition of Eurocentric 
measures of development, or through the 
extension of U.S. foreign policy interests. 
As a result, I argue that while the Peace 
Corps remains connected to and funded by 
the U.S. federal government, it cannot begin 
to take responsibility for damage it has 
caused, nor can it boast of the “equitable 
intercultural relationships” it helps to form, 
when its structure remains one of 
neocolonialism. 
The presence of the federal 
government within PC structure allows the 
agency a sort of “untouchable privilege.” 
The Peace Corps would never acknowledge 
its role in foreign interference because, by 
doing so, it would implicate the United 
States government. This allows the agency 
to be entirely complicit. This “privilege” and 
resulting lack of accountability is exactly 
why Kwame Nkrumah, the former Prime 
Minister and President of Ghana, despised 
neocolonialism. “For those who practice it,” 
he writes in his book, Neo-Colonialism: The 
Last Stage of Imperialism, 
“[neocolonialism] means power without 
responsibility and for those who suffer from 
it, it means exploitation without redress”.29 
The former volunteers of Harvard 
Crimson’s article made this crucial 
observation in 1968 when they found “the 
bureaucratic loyalty of these administrators 
is to Washington” only, and not to the 
volunteers, staff, or communities the agency 
is supposed to serve.30  Sadly, nothing has 
changed in the decades since that article was 
published. 
For these reasons, we cannot expect 
the Peace Corps to suddenly take full 
accountability for the harm it has caused, 
acknowledge the role it has played (and 
continues to play) in the neocolonial 
oppression of developing countries, attempt 
to remedy its structural inequities, or trust 
the agency to conduct a deep, meaningful, 
and lasting reform. Instead, many argue the 
ideologies that helped establish the Peace 
Corps are too integral within PC structure to 
be removed. Of these in dissent, the group 
“Decolonizing Peace Corps” (a collection of 
former PC volunteers who criticize the 
“unethical” system they participated in) is 
vocally advocating for the agency’s 
abolition. 31 
In a slightly different approach, the 
former volunteers in the Harvard Crimson 
piece advocated for a separation of the 
organization from the U.S. government and 
suggested the Peace Corps be turned “into 
an internationally administered agency,” 
“where administrative power is shared by 
representatives of various societies [and] 
where the interplay of their differing 
interests produces truly flexible programs 
that can be transferred from culture to 
culture, rather than imposed by one culture 
on another”. 32 
Merely privatizing the agency will 
not solve its problems but the suggestion of 
internationalizing it makes a great deal of 
sense. By having better oversight and 
external assessments, it would allow for 
more accountability, greater local input, and 
fewer Americans in positions of power in 
foreign countries. However, for as long as 
the Peace Corps remains a mechanism of the 
U.S. government and benefits from the 
“positional superiority” it receives as such, 
the agency cannot effectively demonstrate 
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equitable intercultural partnerships on a 
large-scale international level. 
 
Structural Issue #2: Inexperienced and 
Unqualified Hires 
One of the most consistent gripes 
against the Peace Corps has been for their 
fondness in hiring inexperienced volunteers 
who lack the specialized skills that 
developing countries often request, like 
“doctors, education specialists, and crop 
extensionists,”.33 While all volunteers 
undergo training prior to service, this 
instruction is sometimes the first technical 
experience some receive in their sector and 
it is insufficient for many: the agency’s own 
2009 Annual Volunteer Survey revealed 1 in 
4 volunteers reported their job-related 
training as ineffective or poor and that 
“technical training [ranked] the lowest of the 
five training areas”.34 This technical training 
should not be the first experience volunteers 
have in their sector; however, this is often 
the case, as PC recruits “B.A. generalists,” 
or young college graduates with liberal arts 
degrees, who still lack “the specific training 
or professional employment sought by the 
host nations”. 35 
Despite other agency-wide reforms, 
the Peace Corps’ recruitment of 
inexperienced volunteers remains consistent 
and, if anything, has gotten worse. In 1965, 
70% of recruited volunteers were generalists 
that lacked specialized skills36, whereas this 
number had increased to 85% in 2019. 37 
This hiring trend reflects a deeply-held 
belief that unskilled and inexperienced 
Americans are still qualified enough to 
provide new insights and assistance to 
developing countries. This is a dangerous 
and arrogant assumption that connects 
directly to Western superiority, American 
exceptionalism, the white savior complex, 
and colonizer behavior. 
I argue this hiring trend will not 
significantly change for two reasons. First 
and foremost, the trend and its 
accompanying belief in Western superiority 
is inseparable from PC values and early 
goals: it was President Kennedy’s original 
belief that “all volunteers were capable of 
giving the ‘underdeveloped’ nations ‘a hand 
in building a society’”, regardless of their 
actual qualifications. 36 Secondly, 
recommendations to hire more qualified 
applicants and focus resources on the 
“improvement of technical training” and 
“additional training days for volunteers” 
have been previously made by the agency’s 
own internal assessments, but to no avail.38 
In order to show their values are no longer 
in line with arrogant notions of Western 
superiority, the Peace Corps needs to 
rebrand their recruitment materials, come up 
with a more equitable and culturally-
sensitive motto (as opposed to the current 
“Make the Most of Your World” which is 
thick with American entitlement), and hire 
only technically-qualified applicants with 
relevant field experience in the future. 
 
Structural Issue #3: Failure to Prioritize 
Local Leadership 
As mentioned earlier, there are two 
elements of the existing Peace Corps model 
that incorporate host country national input: 
the assignment of a local civilian counterpart 
to each volunteer during service and the host 
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country national hires that staff Peace Corps 
country offices. The goals of these two 
elements were to prioritize the “partnership” 
between Americans and host country 
nationals; to reduce ethnocentric 
assumptions of development by informing 
volunteers of pre-existing community needs; 
and to provide the agency with local 
representation to ensure a cooperative and 
equal environment.39 While these goals are 
great in theory, they have not worked well in 
practice. Below, I discuss three problems 
that exist in the PC model, as they relate to 
local host country national staff. 
The first issue here is that the Peace 
Corps does not pay civilian counterparts in 
the way that host country staff receives 
reimbursements or salaries.40 This 
fundamentally devalues their input, 
dismisses their efforts to assist volunteers in 
establishing community projects, and 
reinforces the idea that HCNs are less 
important than the volunteers they serve 
alongside. In order to repair this, 
“Decolonizing Peace Corps” has outlined 
demands for financial compensation and 
increased counterpart involvement, urging 
that “counterparts [be] paid on the basis of 
2-5 year fellowships” and “be responsible 
for completing community assessments, 
identifying projects, [and] applying for and 
managing grants” so they have more control 
over the projects and finances in their local 
communities. 40 
The second issue that arises is the 
dual responsibility of host country nationals. 
Host country staff are hired to both provide 
support to volunteers and provide HCN 
representation. This is problematic because, 
when locals play a secondary “supportive” 
role to volunteers, it centers Americans 
when volunteers should be the ones 
supporting local community leaders. 
Additionally, mere host country 
representation does not automatically create 
beneficial multicultural spaces, just as the 
recruitment of diverse identities does not 
solve racism. Instead, the Peace Corps must 
prioritize ICD&I measures to ensure its 
workplaces are safe for non-Americans and 
that HCN suggestions, concerns and efforts 
will be heard and appreciated. 
The third issue that exists is the lack 
of employment opportunities for host 
country nationals to serve the Peace Corps. 
Only Americans are eligible to become 
Volunteers or Country Directors, yet even 
HCN staff positions are often limited in 
what they can offer the agency. 40 This 
deficiency in the organization’s structure 
fails to encourage more local input, 
guidance, and feedback (something PC 
would highly benefit from) and reinforces 
the idea that the Peace Corps exists 
primarily for Americans. Following their 
suggestion to “internationalize the Peace 
Corps,” the former volunteers of the 
Harvard Crimson piece envisioned a model 
where locals could “plan and direct 
programs in [their own countries]” and 
Americans, if they still wanted to serve, 
could “put themselves in subordinate 
positions, [and] allow themselves to be 
really used by the people who live [there]”.41 
While this is far from the current PC 
structure, I argue the benefits of an 
internationalized plan like this one would 
allow for more HCN staff positions and 
leadership roles—thus allowing locals to 
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play a substantial role in their own 
development. 
Conclusion 
The most pressing steps the Peace 
Corps can take towards accountability 
include separating itself from the United 
States government and federal funding; 
acknowledging its intentionally deceitful 
past and role as a neocolonial actor; and 
working to address several structural issues 
within its model—like answering to the 
countries and communities it “serves”, 
hiring only qualified applicants as 
volunteers, and incorporating more host 
country leadership and input into its 
organizational structure. 
That said, I acknowledge how even 
if the agency were to take these steps and 
rebrand itself entirely, its fundamental 
nature as an international development 
organization operates within a field based on 
Eurocentric values and relies on “global 
power differentials”.42 Here, I reiterate the 
problem that is the Peace Corps in and of 
itself—a United States government agency 
that was established with clear neocolonial 
intent and uses federal funds to exploit 
developing countries in the name of 
American foreign policy interests. It is their 
“positional superiority” as a U.S. 
government entity within the field of 
international development that prevents the 
agency from being held truly accountable 
for the harm they have caused. 
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The Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan Border: 





Kyrgyzstan, a small country in Central Asia, 
shares a complex border with its neighbor 
Uzbekistan. While these borders were 
created during the Soviet era, and were 
drawn by leaders in Moscow, in the post-
Soviet years new problems have arisen from 
the complex borders. A number of different 
ethnic groups are spread amongst the five 
Uzbek exclaves and two Tajik exclaves that 
are located adjacent to Kyrgyz territory. 
This difficult set of national borders also 
complicates sharing the water that flows thru 
the Ferghana Valley. 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, I will analyze the international 
border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, and how the contemporary 
Uzbek-Kyrgyz border’s division of the 
surrounding ethnic groups remains as a 
legacy of the Soviet era. I start by explaining 
the complicated border which is the basis for 
the dispute. I then examine the origins of the 
dispute back in the Soviet era, before 
moving on to developments in the dispute 
since Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan gained 
their independence in. Finally, I explore the 
wider geopolitical implications of the 
dispute, particularly in relation to the U.S.-
China rivalry.  
 
Background 
Kyrgyzstan is among the poorest of the 
nations of Central Asia: its per capita is a 
mere tenth of its larger neighbor 
Kazakhstan.1 Formerly a constituent 
republic of the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist 
Republic declared independence as 
Kyrgyzstan on August 31, 1991. Between 
1924 and 1927 Soviet officials drew curly 
borders for their then-constituent republics, 
and in the process, they separated groups of 
Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks inhabiting the 
Ferghana Valley:2 home to nearly one 
quarter of Central Asia’s population.3 
 Unlike the other former Soviet 
republics of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has 
largely experienced democracy since 
independence. Revolutions ousted the 
Kyrgyz presidents in 2005 and 2010; the 
former revolution was peaceful, while the 
latter included carnage in its chronology.4 
Furthermore, a competitive election in 2017 
resulted in a peaceful transition from 
President Almazbek Atambayev to his 
protégé Sooronbay Jeenbekov, without a 
revolution. However, despite handing over 
power, former President Atambayev 
continues to harshly criticize the actions of 
his successor. President Jeenbekov has also 
worked to consolidate his power, as he has 
threatened to imprison a political opponent 
of his – Ömürbek Babanov – on the charge 
of inciting conflict between the ethnics 
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.5 
 Kyrgyzstan lies between Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan in the west and south, China 
in the east, and Kazakhstan in the north. The 
country is covered in mountains with 88 
mountain ranges.6 These mountain ranges 
separate communities within Kyrgyzstan, 
contributing to regional differences and 
national instability.7 The capital of Bishkek 
is the main population center for northern 
Kyrgyzstan, while the area between Jalal-
39
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Abad and Osh comprises the most populated 
part of southern Kyrgyzstan. As seen in 
Figure 1, the former lies just South of 
Kazakhstan while the latter area lies just east 
of Uzbekistan; Osh and Bishkek are two 
cities the lie outside of the seven oblasts 
(regions) and hold an equivalent status as 
the oblasts.8 
 The Ferghana Valley is an area 
divided among Kyrgyzstan and its 
neighbors: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The 
valley’s fertile agricultural land produces a 
large amount of food for Central Asia, while 
subject to the availability of water.9 The 
twisting borders and narrow stretches of 
land are relics of Soviet rule and continue to 
cause disputes between Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. Its 10 million inhabitants 
include ethnic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks.10 
However, during the Soviet era, residents 
became accustomed to their ability to cross 
the inter-Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), as 
the Ferghana Valley lacked the border 
controls present in other areas of the Soviet 
Union.11 
 
Figure 1. Political Divisions of Kyrgyzstan, map 
from Bigstock (Richard Weitz, “Kyrgyzstan and the 
Afghan Campaign’s Logistical Challenges,” Second 




Misaligned Ethnicities in the Ferghana 
Valley 
 While many countries have borders 
that were drawn arbitrarily, Kyrgyzstan’s 
borders are especially problematic. There 
are five exclaves where portions of Uzbek 
territory are completely surrounded by 
Kyrgyzstan: Sokh, Shohimardon, Chon 
Qora/Qalacha, and Jani-Ayil (Halmiyon), as 
well as two Tajik exclaves.12 At 350 km2, 
Sokh is the largest of these exclaves, and 
according to Baumgartner, has experienced 
several conflicts between its 50,000 Uzbek 
citizens and the guards securing the Kyrgyz 
border.13 To complicate matters further, 
Sokh’s residents are 99% ethnic Tajiks.14 
This mismatch of residency and identity is 
not unique to the Sokh exclave; national 
borders separate divide ethnic groups of the 
Ferghana Valley while pushing together 
other distinct groups (fig. 2; fig. 3).15 
Furthermore, this disconnect between ethnic 
identity and location within national 
boundaries is especially pronounced in 
northern Tajikistan, where Uzbeks and 
Tajiks are interspersed16 like chocolate and 
vanilla in a marble cake. 
  
Figure 2. Political Map of the Ferghana Valley 
(Sabatar, “Normalization process between.”). 
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Figure 3. Demographics of the Fergana Valley 
(“Central Asia: Tensions.”). 
 Ethnic tensions in the region are 
nothing new and most recently flared up in 
2010 when clashes between the two ethnic 
groups left hundreds of locals dead.17 The 
Soviet era infrastructure impacts 
contemporary disagreements over water 
resources and the border itself. A Soviet-
built network of canals connects the water 
supply systems of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan, causing disagreements over 
how much water each of the three “stans” 
should receive.18 In general, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan have an abundance of water but 
lack electricity, while Uzbekistan (and 
Kazakhstan) have excess electricity but a 
scarce amount of water.19 There have been 
multiple efforts to improve the water 
distribution system in the Ferghana Valley. 
The world bank funded improvements and 
modernizations in Uzbekistan’s water 
infrastructure from 2010 to 2016.20 
Similarly, the International Water 
Management Institute had a project started 
in 2001 which sought to respect local needs 
for water resources and improve the soil 
fertility in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Tajikistan.21 In 2017, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan were able to agree on a dam on 
the Naryn River, while in 2018, 
Uzbekistan’s president announced his 
support for the Rogun dam in Tajikistan. 
Continued cooperation is possible, provided 
the three nations are willing to overlook the 
“deep-seated mistrust”22 that currently 
exists. 
 Throughout history the Ferghana 
Valley had been subjected and inhabited by 
numerous cultures, such as the Greeks, 
Arabs, Mongols, and Turks, all of which 
affected the socio-political landscape of the 
valley.23 In the mid-19th century Tsarist 
Russia conquered the Ferghana Valley from 
the Khanate of Qo’qon.24 Also known as 
Kokand, the Khanate was not ethnically-
based, but rather was a “dynastic and feudal 
entity.”25 
 Many of the issues from the Kyrgyz-
Uzbek border and other borders in the 
region are a product of Russian imperialism 
– first in the way of the Russian Empire, and 
later by the hand of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR). Before 1924, 
when the creation of the Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan border began, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan had not existed as sovereign 
states. According to Megoran, there were 
not Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups quite 
the way there are today.26 Before the 
creation of the border in the 1920s, ethnic 
identification was not familiar to many 
inhabitants of Central Asia.27 The history of 
migrations in the region had not provided 
clear, geographically segregated ethnic 
groups. The Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, and 
Kazakhs likely all descended from the 
people inhabiting the Uzbek confederation 
of the fifteenth century.28 The origins of the 
Kyrgyz people are less clear, but the 
consensus is that part of the Kyrgyz 
population migrated from southern Siberia 
to modern Kyrgyzstan in the fifteenth 
century, but that another portion of the 
Kyrgyz population is descended from 
nomads who had arrived in the region long 
before the fifteenth century.29 When 
considered on the basis of language, the 
Tajiks are distinct from the other four large 
ethnic groups of post-Soviet Central Asia: 
the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and 
Turkmens,30 who all speak Turkic 
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languages.31 The Tajik Language, however, 
is a relative of Persian.32 
The Soviet Union selected historical 
designations and used them as the basis for 
ethnicities, by codifying distinct languages, 
selecting capitals for the union republics, 
and compiling national historiographies.33 
The ethnicity names created by the Soviet 
Union did not match the self-identification 
of residents of Central Asia: boundary 
surveyors reported confusion about 
matching people to ethnic labels if their own 
labels were not on the official list of Central 
Asian ethnonyms. Perhaps most 
consequentially, the Soviet officials drew 
borders between the Uzbek Soviet Socialist 
Republic (SSR), the Kirghiz SSR, and the 
other central Asian SSRs. Even after the 
creation of these borders, many residents did 
not “distinguish between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan”.34 
 
A New International Border 
 Kyrgyzstan’s most important 
relations are with its neighbors: Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and China, as well 
as nearby Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. 
Uzbekistan has accused both Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan of inadequately protecting 
their borders, allowing an unlimited flow of 
drugs to travel across the latter two 
countries.35 Uzbekistan relied on its 
authoritarian dictator Islam Karimov to 
strongly enforce its borders – Karimov died 
in 2016. 
 Upon independence in 1991, the 
border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
became an international border overnight. 
Initially, the border was not tangible and the 
respective countries made a minimal effort 
to demarcate the border.36 However, over 
the next few years, political and economic 
differences between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan caused the lenient border 
practices to disintegrate. In 1993, 
Uzbekistan temporarily closed its border to 
Kyrgyzstan and introduced its own unique 
currency. Later on, Uzbekistan abandoned 
daylight savings time and adopted the Latin 
alphabet, all the while Kyrgyzstan kept 
daylight savings and the Cyrillic alphabet.37 
Disagreements have pitted the Ferghana 
Valley portion of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan against the remainder of the 
respective countries. During the 1990s, the 
Ferghana Valley played an important role in 
Tajikistan’s civil war,38 providing many 
anti-regime fighters.39 Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan also experienced regional 
instability in the 1990s, in which their 
portions of the Ferghana Valley experienced 
unrest. During that period, there were 
extremists from the Ferghana Valley who 
executed sporadic attacks in southern 
Kyrgyzstan.40  
 The situation between Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan became more tense in 1999. 
In January 1999, Uzbekistan closed its 
border for an indefinite amount of time. On 
February 13, 1999, President Karimov 
declared that “Kyrgyzstan is a poor country, 
and it is not my job to look after the 
people”.41 In August 1999, The Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – an 
organization of “dissident Islamist guerillas 
headed by Ferghana Valley exiles linked to 
militant Islamist groups in Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan”42 – invaded southern 
Kyrgyzstan and adjacent areas of Tajikistan. 
As a consequence of the IMU’s actions, 
Uzbekistan began erecting a fence – which 
is two meters high - along its Ferghana 
Valley border; factories in Uzbekistan were 
required to fire any employees who were 
ethnically Kyrgyz. The creation of a 
borderland continued as President Karimov 
decreed that all visitors to Uzbekistan 
staying longer than three days needed a 
visa.43 Understandably, this did not go over 
well with Kyrgyzstan, for as Karimov knew 
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quite well, most Kyrgyzstan’s residents were 
already struggling economically. 
 
The Chinese and the Americans 
 The other important state actors 
interacting with Kyrgyzstan are the U.S. and 
Russia, who vie with China for influence in 
Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. global war on terror 
has affected Kyrgyzstan, albeit not as 
severely as Afghanistan, and pressured it to 
strengthen its border security.44 However, 
Russia, China, and the U.S. do not place 
Kyrgyzstan as a high priority, meaning each 
state does not have the goal of eliminating 
the influence of the other two.45 
Nevertheless, these three major powers have 
reasons to maintain an interest in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 China has the greatest reason to 
worry; its officials fear that instability in the 
Kyrgyz Republic could contribute to unrest 
in China,46 particularly the autonomous 
territory of Xinjiang which is home to a 
large number of ethnic Uyghurs. Uyghurs 
and Kyrgyz are both Turkic ethnic groups. 
The U.S.’s concerns regarding Kyrgyzstan 
derive from its proximity to Afghanistan: 
only Tajikistan separates the two countries. 
The short distance separating Kyrgyzstan 
and Afghanistan has allowed the U.S. to use 
Manas International Airport in the former 
for its military operations in the latter.47 The 
U.S. found this arrangement necessary after 
Uzbekistan expelled U.S. military officers 
from its territory in 2005. 
Conclusion 
 The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border 
dispute has taken a century to develop into 
something threatening enough to make the 
two neighbors adversaries of one another. 
The borders as drawn by the Soviets fail to 
align with the distribution of persons of 
differing ethnicities; the enclaves only make 
negotiations more difficult.48 Perhaps the 
national borders could be redrawn by the 
countries themselves, allowing the borders 
to align with the ethnic groups in the valley. 
It would also be beneficial for the countries 
of the Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) if they could 
devise a plan to share the water in the valley. 
The situation would also benefit from 
Uzbekistan being more understanding of 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 Yet, perhaps Uzbekistan is not the 
biggest threat to Kyrgyzstan’s well-being. 
Megoran argues that middle-class Kyrgyz 
people worry most about the elites 
destroying the country. Uzbeks agree, and 
one Uzbek told a researcher that the ‘big 
ones,’ or the wealthy elites, “keep gobbling 
[up] [Kyrgyzstan] the way they are at the 
moment, the mountains themselves may 
disappear”.49 This reasoning suggests that 
Kyrgyzstan’s income inequality is causing 
issues that should not be neglected. 
Logically, the residents hope for no 
continuation of the environmental 
degradation that occurred under Soviet rule, 
although the Soviet environmental damage 
persists in Kyrgyzstan50 – and other portions 
of the former U.S.S.R. This hope of theirs 
opposes any plans to exploit the land and the 
common people of Kyrgyzstan for the 
benefits of the wealthier elites. Creating a 
more just and equitable society could 
improve the socio-economic stability within 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 The first step in decreasing income 
inequality is to decrease corruption in the 
Kyrgyz government. If the politicians in 
power ceased imprisoning their opponents 
or purging governmental officials they 
quarreled with, government transparency 
and fairness could emerge. If international 
aid was permitted to reach the communities 
it is intended to benefit, better economic 
opportunities could emerge for all residents 
of Kyrgyzstan. Providing more economic 
opportunities for the economically 
marginalized residents of Kyrgyzstan is the 
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most promising solution to this border 
dispute, because a major source of tension 
over the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border is 
the movement of migrants from Kyrgyzstan 
to Uzbekistan in search of better-paying 
employment.51 Like many border disputes, 
this dispute is a proxy: a proxy for the 
sources of distress causing residents of 
Kyrgyzstan to leave their homeland in 
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Neocolonialism, and the 
White Savior Complex 
LILLY W. WILCOX 
 
Abstract 
The Peace Corps has existed since the 
1960s, and its goals – “to help the people of 
interested countries in meeting their need for 
trained men and women, to help promote a 
better understanding of Americans on the 
part of the peoples served, and to help 
promote a better understanding of other 
peoples on the part of Americans” – have 
remained unchanged since that time. 
Because the United States’ government 
determines the funding of the organization, 
the Peace Corps cannot be fully independent 
of the country’s foreign policy. It must be 
examined critically to ensure that the work 
of the Peace Corps is ethical, as it is an 
extension of American soft power. This 
paper draws upon previous research about 
the history of the Peace Corps as well as the 
theories of neocolonialism and the white 
savior complex to argue that the 
organization needs serious reform. Using the 
framework of transformative justice, this 
paper recommends different ways in which 
the organization must be reformed to 
divorce itself from its neocolonialist legacy. 
The organization currently prioritizes 
surface-level change in host communities. If 
the Peace Corps’ ultimate aim is to create 
global equity, it must first make structural 
changes to its funding and leadership models 
and introduce the white savior complex and 
sustainable allyship into the training 
curriculum for its volunteers. 
 
The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural 
Workbook tells many stories of Peace Corps 
volunteers who overcome prejudice and 
discomfort to fulfill their obligations to their 
host communities and learn about 
themselves, actualizing Peace Corps founder 
John F. Kennedy’s dream of the American 
frontiersman.1 However, one story in the 
workbook stands out because it does the 
opposite. An unnamed Peace Corps 
volunteer who worked in Guatemala details 
how much he struggled in his role in the 
community. He was mocked by local kids 
who constantly called him ugly, no one 
attended the meetings he organized about 
farming techniques, and trees he planted for 
the community were intentionally uprooted.2 
While this story is presented in the 
workbook to remind volunteers that working 
in another culture can be a challenge, it also 
undermines the idea that the Peace Corps is 
effective. If a volunteer can be so 
unwelcome in their host community, it 
seems obvious that the Peace Corps needs 
changing.  
The Peace Corps is an integral thread 
in the fabric of American foreign policy.3 As 
criticism of the U.S. military for excess 
intervention in foreign countries becomes 
more mainstream, it is important to look at 
the Peace Corps with a similarly critical 
lens. While the Peace Corps is a largely 
well-liked organization domestically, their 
mission of uplifting so-called developing 
countries can be interpreted as unnecessary, 
unwanted, and harmful. There are many 
negative aspects to aid and development, 
which are often overlooked in favor of the 
inspirational stories of those who lift 
themselves up by the bootstraps with the 
helping hand of an American volunteer.4 
Development and aid are temporary 
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solutions that do not result in meaningful 
change because the problems they try to 
solve are systemic.  
The Peace Corps is an institution that 
helped create a system of reliance on the 
Global North during the development era of 
the 1960s, and it therefore has an obligation 
to shift its goals to help dismantle this 
system. This paper will explain the theory of 
neocolonialism, argue that the Peace Corps 
is a neocolonialist institution, and discuss 
the systemic and individual reforms that the 
Peace Corps should take to divorce itself 
from its harsh legacy.  
The legacy of colonialism has 
created a lasting power imbalance between 
formerly colonized countries and their 
former colonizers, often represented by the 
terms the Global South and Global North.5 
Based on the economic categorizations of 
the United Nations and the World Bank, the 
Global North includes most high-income 
countries, and the Global South includes 
most low and middle-income countries, 
while also accounting for geography.6 This 
language represents a dichotomous—and 
therefore not totally accurate—picture of 
world economies, but the terms are more 
appropriate than First/Third World and 
Developed/Developing Countries—
distinctions that imply a clear inferiority. 
The language of the Global North and 
Global South fit this paper best because they 
represent the geopolitical dynamic most 
respectfully and are founded on the research 
of prominent international organizations that 
are relevant to discussions of development 
and aid. The Global North and Global South 
will be used in this paper to describe 
colonialist and formerly colonized countries 
in general terms.  
The empires of the Global North lost 
their political grip on territories in the 
Global South during the period of 
decolonization in the 1950s and 60s.7 
Colonialism was an economic boon for the 
Global North, imposed through direct 
occupation of the Global South, and 
decolonization threatened to wreak havoc on 
western economies. As former colonies 
became independent, colonialist countries 
lost capital and sought new ways to control 
the Global South.8 Looking for a solution to 
these ails, former colonialist countries 
adopted the practice of neocolonialism, 
which used economic and cultural means to 
control formerly colonized countries.9  
Neocolonialism’s roots in culture 
and the economy allows it to masquerade as 
a positive practice that leads to development 
in the Global South and equity with the 
Global North. This phenomenon is described 
by French Philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, 
who originally coined the term and the idea 
of the “neocolonialist mystification.” In his 
1956 essay “Colonialism is a System,” 
Sartre argues that neocolonialists are those 
who have a positive perspective of the 
colonialist system as a whole, viewing 
themselves as messiahs. These 
neocolonialists blame the failure of the 
colonial system on a select few ill-
intentioned colonists.10 Based on his critique 
of French colonialism in Algeria in this text, 
Sartre outlines several key features of 
colonialism.11 
First, colonialism is an explicitly 
capitalist system, designed to benefit only 
the colonists. The ultimate goal of the 
colonial system is not to create new industry 
in colonized lands; the goal is to enable 
colonists to take advantage of the land and 
the existing industry to benefit their home 
country.12 Algeria had a thriving agriculture 
industry that sustained the country’s 
population before the French occupation. 
The focus of the French agriculture industry 
in Algeria was the exportation of goods back 
to France to make a profit.13 The French 
forced Algerians to less fertile lands in the 
south and overtook their fertile lands in the 
North. In the northern lands, the French 
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developed wine grape crops and overtook 
the grain market. These crops had no use to 
the Algerians because it was against their 
faith to drink wine. While French colonists 
exported their products back to France, 
Algerians starved as their grain crop 
diminished in the south and they were 
forced to work for the French to survive.14  
Additionally, the colonial system 
disempowers workers. During the industrial 
era, modern technology was accessible to 
French colonists in Algeria, and employing 
machines was cheaper than employing 
Algerians. Algerians were already 
impoverished by the French system and 
could not benefit from the technological 
advancements of the modern era themselves. 
The final act of the colonial system, after the 
occupation of native land and exploitation of 
the worker, is the complete redundancy of 
the worker.15 
Sartre also touches upon the 
imposition of culture as a tool of 
colonialism. Language and education are 
tools of empowerment, and the French 
outlawed the use of Arabic in Algeria to 
oppress the Algerian people. In 1956, 80 
percent of Algerians were illiterate after 
France made French the primary language of 
Algeria.16 Additionally, the French pushed 
their values of individualism onto the 
Algerian population, undermining the 
country’s original collective living system.17 
Colonialism assumes a hierarchy of both 
knowledge and values that places the 
colonist on top without considering those 
who are colonized. 
The colonial system relies upon the 
exploitation of the colonized to benefit the 
colonist. The neocolonialist who believes 
that the colonial system can be reformed is 
wholly incorrect because injustice is 
inherent to colonialism.18 Sartre argues that 
there are three potential outcomes to any 
attempt at reform: the reforms will benefit 
the colonists and not the colonized people, 
the colonialist government will deceptively 
undermine the reforms, or the colonialist 
government will patently undermine the 
reforms.  
To explain the first outcome, Sartre 
brings up the potential irrigation of the less-
fertile, southern lands left to the Algerians. 
Ultimately, this would benefit the French 
because French law in Algeria stated that 
colonists had the right to three-quarters of 
irrigated land. This conundrum proves that 
exploitation is built into the system. The 
second outcome manifested when the 
government required that French colonists 
return small portions of their land to be 
mortgaged to Algerians to repay the State 
for the added benefit of irrigation. Rather 
than enacting aggressive reforms that 
actually helped Algerians, the government 
opted to keep themselves in control of land 
redistribution so not to hurt the colonists. To 
prove his third point, Sartre references 
French elections in Algeria, which were 
openly corrupt to benefit the French.19  
While Sartre’s “Colonialism is a 
System” focuses explicitly on colonialism, 
rather than neocolonialism, the two systems 
have a similar focus—economic and cultural 
control. Colonialism emphasizes direct 
exploitation of labor and land, and 
neocolonialism depends upon the grooming 
of economies and value systems of other 
countries to serve the Global North.20 While 
colonialism is clearly an oppressive system, 
it is harder to see the negative effects of the 
reformed system due to the neocolonialist 
mystification.  
Neocolonialism allows colonized 
states more autonomy, but, as Sartre argues, 
only those who have been colonized truly 
understand how to counteract the negative 
effects of the colonial system.21 An example 
of this dynamic can be found in the map of 
development aid distributed by the World 
Bank. The distribution of aid is concentrated 
in many countries that were formerly under 
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a colonial regime, which have had to rely 
upon the assistance of the global hegemony 
following decolonization.22 Formerly 
colonized countries need aid to repair their 
countries from the harms of colonialism, but 
that necessary reliance fuels neocolonialist 
attitudes. Neocolonialist countries do not 
fully cede power to formerly colonized 
countries, and the same assumed hierarchy 
of values remains in place.23 That harmful 
hierarchy is evident in the development 
projects that were established during the 
period of neocolonialism in the mid-20th 
century and still last today.  
Historically, the first two outcomes 
of ineffectual reform—benefit to the 
colonist rather than the colonized and 
deceptive undermining of reforms by the 
colonialist government—have befallen the 
Peace Corps. Its foundational motivation 
was to win the Cold War, while 
masquerading as an altruistic organization 
that heralded “modernization” in the 
countries in which it intervened.24 The Peace 
Corps was founded following the collapse of 
traditional colonialism, but its failings 
reflect the outcomes that Sartre cautioned of 
colonialism.  
The Peace Corps is one such 
development project that has lasted into the 
21st century and is considered as an 
organization of the highest caliber.25 
Nevertheless, it is still marked by its 
neocolonialist history, and the remnants of 
its nationalistic beginnings still shape its 
modern mission. Some have argued that the 
United States cannot be considered a 
neocolonialist country because it did not 
traditionally hold colonies; however, other 
countries do have an economic and cultural 
dependence on the United States, fulfilling 
the criteria for neocolonialism.26 It is not 
necessary for one country to have a history 
of colonialism to subsequently become a 
neocolonialist country.  
In his essay, Neo-colonialism: The 
Last Stage of Imperialism, former President 
of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah defines 
neocolonialism as the subjugation of one 
country by another through either 
“economic or monetary means” or “through 
culture, politics, ideology, literature and 
education.”27 Nkrumah critiqued the United 
States as a neocolonialist country heavily in 
this essay, arguing that traditional foreign 
policy organizations were supplemented by 
international aid organizations like the Peace 
Corps.28  Nkrumah described the Peace 
Corps as a “new instrument to cover the 
ideological arena,” of the United States’ 
“plan for invading the so-called Third 
World.”29 Nkrumah, who is considered one 
of the foremost scholars of neocolonialism, 
designated the United States as a 
neocolonialist country in spite of the fact 
that it never traditionally held colonies and 
included the Peace Corps in his critique. 
The Kennedy administration founded 
the Peace Corps during the Cold War in 
1961 as a tool urgently needed to combat the 
spread of communism and bring more 
countries into the United States’ fold.30 As 
Kennedy administration officials 
brainstormed how to create an organization 
of such scale and importance, Warren 
Wiggins, a State Department official, turned 
to John F. Kennedy’s own words from his 
1961 State of the Union speech. Speaking of 
the United States, Kennedy argued:  
Our role is essential and unavoidable 
in the construction of a sound and 
expanding economy for the entire 
non-communist world...the problems 
in achieving this goal are towering 
and unprecedented—the response 
must be towering and unprecedented 
as well.31  
 
This quote was the backbone of 
Warren Wiggin’s memo, “A Towering 
Task,” which became the founding 
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document of the Peace Corps, illustrating 
that the motivation for founding the Peace 
Corps was hardly altruistic. Instead, foreign 
policy and economics were driving factors, 
which allowed neocolonialism to shape the 
organization. 
Modernization theory of the 1960s 
justified the Peace Corps’ development 
work as altruistic assistance that would bring 
so-called developing countries into the 20th 
century, giving the organization an excuse to 
intervene in the Global South for the United 
States’ benefit. Modernization promised 
economic parity with the superpowers of the 
Global North, albeit under the watchful eye 
of the United States. Gendered language 
permeated the Peace Corps’ arguments for 
modernization. Developing countries were 
marked either as the “little brother” waiting 
to be taken under the wing of the United 
States, or as shamefully effeminate, needing 
the masculine United States to bring them 
into the capitalist brotherhood of the West.32 
The United States used the seductive idea of 
development to convince other countries 
that American involvement in their affairs 
was the best way forward, embodying the 
same principles of the neocolonialist 
mystification. Modernization theory 
presented the United States with an 
alternative to traditional colonialism, which 
allowed the United States to become a 
global superpower through social control of 
developing countries.33  
The rhetoric of American masculine 
stewardship pushed by modernization theory 
was rampant in the fight against the Cold 
War and is best represented by the debate 
about the concept of domestic containment. 
President Nixon argued that domestic 
containment, the idea that embracing rigid 
gender roles, the nuclear family, and 
traditional American values, would propel 
the fight against the Soviets in the Cold 
War.34 In his presidential campaign against 
Nixon, Kennedy strongly rejected the 
domestic containment ideal and campaigned 
upon the fear that the United States was 
losing its masculine ruggedness, a quality 
that the Soviets wholeheartedly embraced. 
Kennedy’s establishment of the Peace Corps 
was an attempt to remedy the growing 
American “softness,” which he thought 
would cost the country the Cold War.35 The 
motivations for the foundation of the Peace 
Corps were to benefit the American 
volunteer more than their host country, 
embodying the same principle that Sartre 
argues is the outcome of failed colonial 
reform.36 Peace Corps host countries became 
the playgrounds at which 20-something-
year-old American men could embrace their 
masculinity through physical labor and 
leadership, while lifting up their host 
countries into the American capitalist 
brotherhood.37 
Entry into this brotherhood was 
contingent on the adoption of American 
values by host countries. The economic 
structure of the Peace Corps embodied the 
idea of individualism, and the Kennedy 
administration used the person-to-person 
development work of the Peace Corps to 
push this value onto host countries. If the 
foremost goal of the Peace Corps was the 
economic development of host countries, the 
organization would have been a tool to 
redistribute the United States wealth 
equitably. Instead, the organization was 
shaped around volunteers doing 
development work for their own betterment. 
Person-to-person work sent the message that 
economic growth started on an individual 
level and did not recognize the structural 
inequality of the world economy shaped by 
centuries of colonialism.38  
This individualistic practice 
prevented the Peace Corps from making 
significant changes in the communities 
volunteers entered. Nanda Shrestha, who 
wrote about his experience with the Peace 
Corps when they came to his Nepali village 
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in 1962, describes that he felt “bewitched” 
by the new Peace Corps school, which was 
nicer than any classroom he had ever seen. 
Nevertheless, Shrestha returned home to 
hunger and poverty. Because of the stark 
contrast, “Poverty had rarely been so 
frightening, or so degrading, in the past.”39 
Volunteers who worked in the school in 
Shrestha’s village did not have the systemic 
understanding of problems that would have 
allowed them to help the whole community. 
Issues were treated individually, which led 
to further degradation in communities that 
did not have the tools they needed to create 
holistic change. These misconceptions of 
modernization theory and the organization’s 
Cold War roots allowed neocolonialist 
practices to become the center of the 
organization. The early Peace Corps was 
both a publicity stunt and a foreign policy 
tool for the United States. 
The Peace Corps has three specific 
goals that have not changed since its 
founding in 1961. The first goal is “to help 
the people of interested countries in meeting 
their need for skilled individuals.”40 This 
goal, although paternalistic, made sense 
during decolonization in the 1960s. Many 
countries did not have well-established 
university systems following the end of 
colonial rule, and Peace Corps volunteers 
could provide support in fields that required 
additional training. However, this is no 
longer the case. Now, most Peace Corps 
host countries have university systems, yet 
jobs that could be done by host country 
nationals are still filled by Peace Corps 
volunteers.41 In the current system, only 
United States citizens can serve as Peace 
Corps volunteers, further limiting options 
for host country nationals who could 
perform skilled work.42 Karen Rothmyer, 
who served as a Peace Corps volunteer in 
Kenya, outlines the problem. Following her 
Peace Corps volunteer experience, she went 
on to teach at the well-established 
University of Nairobi, where she found that 
university graduates struggled to get jobs, 
while Peace Corps volunteer positions were 
constantly filled.43 One of the main 
principles of colonialism, argued by Sartre, 
is the disempowerment of the native 
worker.44 The Peace Corps delegitimizes the 
skill of citizens of host countries and 
prevents sustainable development by 
continually placing Americans in the roles 
of Peace Corps volunteers.  
The second goal is “to promote a 
better understanding of Americans on the 
part of the peoples served.”45 When looking 
at the motivations for the founding of the 
Peace Corps, this goal is more harmful than 
it seems. This goal ties back to the early 
motivations of the Peace Corps, which 
hoped that interpersonal relationships with 
Americans would strengthen Cold War 
allegiances to the U.S. Now this goal 
perpetuates neocolonialism in a more 
discreet way. Americans disrupt the cultural 
stability of their host communities. Through 
their work as Peace Corps volunteers, 
Americans become associated with wealth 
and education, solidifying the hierarchy of 
values that is central to neocolonialism. 
Finally, the Peace Corps hopes “to 
promote a better understanding of other 
peoples on the part of Americans.”46 This 
goal shows that Americans, and Peace Corps 
volunteers by proxy, tend to think of other 
cultures as different and underdeveloped. 
The placement of Americans in the role of 
educators working to lift host country 
citizens out of poverty is a manifestation of 
the idea of the white savior complex.47  
The white savior complex is the view 
of citizens of the Global North as 
themselves as a messiah for the Global 
South as they embark on “voluntourism” 
trips.48 This perspective is rooted in 
colonialism, which began the common 
portrayal of the Global South as inferior to 
the Global North.49 “Voluntourists” partake 
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in overseas charity work often for selfish 
purposes and without considering the true 
effects of their actions, effectively 
supporting the neocolonialist system.50 
While voluntourism is often used to describe 
short-term work or missionary efforts, 
humanitarian aid and development also 
encounter similar problems relating to the 
motivations and outcomes of their work. By 
nature, they perpetuate the white savior 
complex because they depend on the 
paternalistic good will of the Global North 
towards the Global South.51  
The white savior complex is evident 
in the testimonials of Peace Corps 
volunteers—66% of whom are not 
minorities—and example perspectives 
written by the organization itself found in 
the Peace Corps’ pre-departure workbook.52 
One volunteer who worked in Turkey 
describes how his experience was tainted by 
local conventions, which he found were not 
“natural and logical.”53 While the Peace 
Corps workbook points out these 
perceptions to combat them, the idea that 
other cultures are different is ingrained in 
the third goal of the Peace Corps. 
The second and third goals are 
positive in intent, but not necessarily in 
impact. The organization hopes to break 
down cultural barriers by sending American 
volunteers into foreign countries. This 
would work if the Peace Corps was a 
volunteer exchange. Because it is not, it 
perpetuates the idea that host country 
nationals cannot do worthwhile work in the 
U.S. and allows the American volunteers to 
fill the role of the white savior.  
Currently, volunteers apply to work 
in one of six sectors for the Peace Corps—
agriculture, community and economic 
development, environment, health, youth in 
development, and education.54 Agriculture 
volunteers work with host country citizens 
to teach farmers sustainable farming 
techniques with an emphasis on climate 
change and conservation, as well as food 
and nutrition education.55 Volunteers who 
work in the community economic 
development sector teach entrepreneurship 
and business best practices to host country 
locals, often working with other 
development organizations and NGOs. 
Environment volunteers teach about climate 
change and sustainability in host 
communities.56 The health sector focuses on 
HIV/AIDS prevention and education, as 
well as hygiene, water sanitation, nutrition, 
and maternal and child health.57 In Youth in 
Development, volunteers educate young 
people from host communities about social, 
health, and environmental issues.58  
Finally, in education, the largest 
Peace Corps sector, volunteers teach a 
variety of subjects in schools of all levels. 
There is an emphasis on English language 
education, and volunteers can become 
certified in Teaching English as a Foreign 
Language.59 As Sartre points out, 
assimilation through language is a common 
tool of neocolonialism, which reinforces the 
hierarchy of ideals that values the culture of 
the Global North.60 While teaching the 
English language is not negative in itself, it 
is important to recognize the assumptions 
that the program makes about the weight of 
one language over another. Volunteers do 
learn local languages, but that is out of 
necessity for their two-year assignment. In 
contrast, the locals learning English is seen 
as a necessary tool for modernization. 
The language used in the Peace 
Corps’ description of these sectors 
emphasizes the idea of empowerment. 
Volunteers are there to empower host 
country communities, an aim that was not 
present in early Peace Corps 
documentation.61 Through language, the 
organization subtly recognizes its past 
failings. If empowerment had always been 
the goal of the organization, the organization 
would no longer be necessary. Despite this 
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turn in language, the organization still has 
not escaped its paternalistic past, and some 
volunteers still harbor this attitude. Common 
issues that Peace Corps volunteers have is 
the perception that they know better than the 
locals with whom they work.62 The Peace 
Corps emphasizes teaching in the language 
used to describe volunteers’ roles without 
emphasizing the learning they will do. As 
Sartre argues, local people know their 
communities best—neocolonialism assumes 
the opposite.63  
By pushing capitalism on developing 
countries with the promise of becoming a 
member of the U.S. economic brotherhood 
and by promoting American ideals through 
education and the other sectors of the Peace 
Corps, it is clear that the Peace Corps 
perpetuates neocolonialism through both the 
economic and cultural control of other 
countries. The Peace Corps must be 
reformed using the theory of transformative 
redistribution and recognition to divorce 
itself from neocolonialist attitudes and better 
serve host countries.  
Scholar Nancy Fraser theorizes that 
justice can be broken down into calls for 
either redistribution of wealth or recognition 
of culture.64 Issues of cultural injustice seek 
remedies of recognition, the practice of 
revaluing particular groups that are 
culturally marginalized. Alternatively, the 
solution to economic issues is redistribution 
of wealth to rid the system of economic 
injustice.65 Development and aid are 
functions of the liberal welfare state, which 
recognizes the need for redistribution and 
recognition but attempts to solve immediate 
rather than structural issues, embodying the 
theory of affirmative redistribution and 
recognition. This approach to change means 
that development organizations cannot truly 
solve the problems they claim to address. 
The alternative to affirmative redistribution 
and recognition is transformation, which is 
more effective because it takes a systemic 
approach to combating injustice.  
Affirmation is ineffective because it 
provides surface-level solutions to problems 
rooted in structural inequality, essentially 
informing the principles of the liberal 
welfare state. It also values the concept of 
multiculturalism without acknowledging the 
ways in which economic problems prey on 
it.66 Wealth is redistributed to those who 
have less of it, but the structural reasons 
behind the imbalance of wealth is not 
examined. Multiculturalism is valued 
without understanding the harms that are 
produced by emphasizing differences. 
Cultural value is ingrained into unjust 
economic structures. By maintaining 
identity groups, there is room for groups to 
be othered, and the root of economic issues 
remains untouched. Affirmation creates an 
“aid addiction,” through which the Global 
North controls developing countries 
economically.67 The Peace Corps is a tool 
that perpetuates aid addiction in the form of 
human capital outsourced from the United 
States. The organization continually supplies 
host countries with aid and American Peace 
Corps volunteers, who are essentially 
employed by the United States’ government 
and take roles that could be filled with 
qualified candidates from host countries. 
This furthers the perception that the Global 
South is inferior to the Global North, when 
it is actually the fault of unjust economic 
structures.  
 The Peace Corps should be reformed 
to embrace the theory of transformative 
redistribution and recognition. 
Transformation is a more serious 
restructuring of society, which entails 
deconstructing identity dichotomies to 
achieve true economic parity.68 
Transformation recognizes that sustainable 
change cannot happen without restructuring 
the economy to rid it of cultural injustice. 
The Peace Corps depends on the dichotomy 
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of the rich Global North and the poor Global 
South to justify its affirmative work. To 
create sustainable change in host countries, 
the organization should focus on combating 
this perception of superiority and focus on 
collaboration with its host country partners. 
Economic parity cannot exist while the 
Peace Corps fuels the aid addiction system.  
If the Peace Corps wants to function 
as a tool for achieving economic and 
cultural equality, its ultimate goal should be 
that the organization becomes obsolete. It 
should work to redistribute capital in a 
sustainable way, rather than attempting to 
solve structural economic problems without 
changing the structure itself. Actions like 
teaching agricultural techniques or business 
skills are helpful on a small scale but do not 
address the economic inequalities and 
cultural hierarchy between the Global North 
and Global South that remain from the 
colonial era. While this structural inequality 
remains, the Peace Corps will continue to 
inadvertently other the cultures and 
individuals of host countries due to 
entrenched perceptions about the Global 
South. 
 The Peace Corps is a function of 
neocolonialism and the liberal welfare state 
associated with affirmation, and it is 
ingrained in the American consciousness, so 
it is unlikely it will be completely abolished 
anytime soon. Realistically, change to the 
system will happen gradually, so the 
American public can acclimatize to the idea 
of transformation of the Peace Corps. There 
are three policies that the Peace Corps must 
adopt to divorce itself from the 
neocolonialist system. 
 The Peace Corps could do significant 
good by redistributing the country’s wealth 
with the resources of the United States’ 
government at hand. As of 2010, estimates 
show that even a 2% redistribution of wealth 
could eliminate extreme poverty.69 
However, organizations like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, which were created to address 
economic inequality, fund foreign 
governments with the expectation that they 
adopt neoliberal economic policies, while 
fueling their aid addiction and preventing 
true global equity.70 If the Peace Corps 
pivots to redistributing wealth to other 
governments, it will likely fall into the same 
pattern of promoting aid addiction by 
providing conditional loans like the IMF and 
the World Bank, rather than how it does 
now through the practice of sending 
volunteers. It would not be able to avoid the 
critiques of capitalism while under the 
charge of the United States government. In 
order to radically rethink redistribution, the 
focus of the Peace Corps should first be 
transformative recognition. By confronting 
its neocolonialist past and altering its 
organizational structure to become more 
collaborative, the Peace Corps will be better 
equipped to supply monetary aid and 
volunteers to host countries in ways dictated 
by host countries. As Sartre argues, only 
formerly colonized countries—not formerly 
colonial countries—can undo the damage 
done to their countries by colonialism.71 
 The Peace Corps insists that it is an 
independent agency that does not carry out 
the foreign policy goals of Congress or the 
White House, but critics acknowledge that it 
is in fact a form of American soft power.72 It 
does not function like a traditional foreign 
policy tool because it is collaborative in 
some ways with foreign governments—host 
countries must agree to be a part of the 
program. However, the goals of the Peace 
Corps show that it is an attempt to promote a 
positive image of the United States, 
bolstering traditional foreign policy 
objectives through public relations. While 
the American government does not write the 
organization’s goals, its financial capacity 
for good is regulated by the budget set by 
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the federal government, and therefore it is 
not fully independent.73  
Many critics argue that the Peace 
Corps should transition to a mixed funding 
model in which it would be partially 
government-funded, and partially funded 
through private grants and donations.74 In 
this scenario, the federal government would 
still have a financial stake in the Peace 
Corps, and the agency still would face the 
dilemma of—at best—reflecting or—at 
worst—carrying out American foreign 
policy. Complete privatization is also an 
untenable solution. If the Peace Corps was 
in the hands of private American citizens, 
the issue of cultural misrecognition would 
likely go unaddressed. The worst outcome 
of privatization would lead the Peace Corps 
further down the damaging path towards the 
white savior complex or cause it to become 
more similar to damaging missionary 
organizations. The best outcome would see 
it still solely in the hands of the American 
people who alone cannot rectify the 
organization’s past or their own 
misconceptions about host countries. If the 
Peace Corps becomes a private institution, it 
will not be able to embrace the structural 
change needed to comply with the principles 
of transformation.  
To solve both the issues of cultural 
misrecognition by the Peace Corps and the 
issue of its funding, the United States 
government and the governments of host 
nations should work collaboratively, similar 
to the structure of the Fulbright Program.75 
As an international institution based on the 
principles of partnership and representation, 
the Peace Corps will be able to combat 
misrecognition and structural inequality 
within the organization. While international 
institutions can still carry out neocolonial 
missions, the checks and balances 
established in a cooperative international 
institution will help mitigate this. The Peace 
Corps should be funded by the government 
of the United States and the governments of 
participating countries, so that it cannot be 
regulated by the foreign policy objectives of 
the United States alone. As the organization 
functions now, it is unlikely that other 
governments would consent to this. Host 
countries receive aid from the Peace Corps, 
but their citizens do not participate equally 
in the organization.  
The Peace Corps would benefit from 
having host country nationals in Peace 
Corps leadership and volunteer positions 
within their own country, which would give 
host country governments more reason to 
back the Peace Corps economically.76 This 
would help to solve issues of misrecognition 
by the U.S. Peace Corps volunteers and of 
the first goal of the Peace Corps, which aims 
to supply skilled individuals to Peace Corps 
host countries. The language of 
empowerment that the Peace Corps uses to 
describe their own work should be translated 
into real change. The organization should 
empower host country locals by putting 
them in leadership positions, rather than 
relying on the myth of the benevolent 
American volunteer who knows best. In this 
case, the American volunteer would become 
unnecessary, furthering the Peace Corps 
towards its own dismantling.  
 As an agency that works 
collaboratively between countries, the Peace 
Corps should set up an exchange program 
with the ultimate goal of dismantling the 
United States’ Americentric mentality.77 The 
Peace Corps faces the problem of the white 
savior complex; the goals of the 
organization allow volunteers to see 
themselves as superior to the locals with 
whom they work in their host countries. If 
cultural exchange becomes the norm, 
Americans who volunteer with the Peace 
Corps will have a more complete 
understanding of cultures other than their 
own. Misrecognition can be combated 
through familiarity, which will blur the lines 
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drawn to distinguish culture and prevent 
economic disparity from again taking root 
based on cultural prejudices in the fashion of 
transformative justice.78  
 Once the Peace Corps becomes a 
collaborative, multinational organization, it 
can be reformed in the manner of 
transformative redistribution. Armed with 
the resources of the United States’ 
government and the guidance of decolonized 
countries, the Peace Corps will be able to 
fulfill Sartre’s expectation that formerly 
colonized countries dictate their own healing 
from the harms of colonialism.79 As an 
international organization, the Peace Corps 
must work towards transformative 
recognition that dismantles the hegemony of 
the United States and the Global North. 
Effective redistribution must be dictated by 
each host country without the threat of 
neoliberal capitalism and with any American 
volunteers under the supervision of their 
host country. Additionally, American 
leaders within the partnership of the Peace 
Corps must undergo a complete shift in 
mindset regarding neocolonialist hierarchy. 
The organization’s transformation cannot 
afford to be hindered by the backwards 
thinking of a few American leaders 
mystified by neocolonialism. 
Individual actors within the Peace 
Corps system, including the leaders who 
work collaboratively with host countries, 
must be educated on sustainable allyship in 
addition to systemic change, so they can 
work within the system to create global 
equity. For the institution of the Peace Corps 
to undergo transformational reform, 
American neocolonialist mindsets must be 
shifted. International organizations have the 
tools to prevent neocolonialism but are not 
neocolonial by nature. Without the 
cooperation of leaders who have 
decolonized their perception of global 
politics and economics, neocolonialism 
could take hold through the influence of the 
countries deemed powerful.  
Thorough education on the white 
savior complex and sustainable allyship for 
American Peace Corps volunteers and 
leaders will be essential to ensuring that the 
organization can undergo its transformation. 
Additionally, because transformation will 
not happen overnight, this education will 
help prevent issues of cultural 
misrecognition by American Peace Corps 
volunteers who serve before the 
organization is reformed. While the Peace 
Corps does conduct three months of training 
before Peace Corps volunteers begin their 
work, the white savior complex is not 
mentioned once in their 266 page 
workbook.80 Training emphasizes how to 
combat ethnocentrism and practice “cultural 
sensitivity,” but the workbook does not 
acknowledge how it systemically 
perpetuates those problems.81 
 One way to combat the white savior 
complex is to increase training on 
sustainable allyship for Peace Corps 
volunteers. Effective social justice allies are 
“members of dominant social groups who 
are working to end the system of oppression 
that gives them greater privilege and power 
based on their social-group membership.”82 
Becoming a social justice ally requires 
constant meditation about one’s role in 
systems of oppression, and Peace Corps 
volunteers who wish to force the hand of the 
organization in favor of transformation must 
be trained on the statuses of social justice 
ally identity development.83 Peace Corps 
volunteers must reject the idea of dominant 
cultures and use their privilege to work with 
oppressed groups to dismantle the system, 
achieving autonomy status as a social justice 
ally.84 
To combat the harms of the white 
savior complex and voluntourism, Peace 
Corps volunteers and leaders must work 
towards being an ally for social justice 
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rather than for self-interest or altruism. The 
white savior mentality is a key part of both 
self-interest and altruism-motivated allyship. 
Those who are motivated by self-interest 
have a sense of pride in their work that 
prevents them from seeing systemic 
oppression and view themselves as a savior 
due to the work they are doing.85 While 
those who are motivated by altruism have 
little more awareness of systems of 
oppression, they understand how it functions 
without recognizing their role in it. Their 
guilt about systems of oppression manifests 
in their attempt to be a hero, treating the 
oppressed paternalistically.86  
Allies for social justice work 
collaboratively with the oppressed group 
and are held accountable by those with 
whom they work. They understand the ways 
they benefit from the systems of oppression 
and understand that dismantling the systems 
is also an act of self-liberation, in 
accordance with the principles of 
transformative justice.87 Peace Corps 
volunteers and leaders who embody the 
practice of social justice allyship will be 
essential to the transformative recognition 
and redistribution that the Peace Corps must 
undergo. 
The question then remains, are 
current and aspiring Peace Corps volunteers 
perpetuating the harms of neocolonialism 
themselves? While they have a hand in the 
system, they do not control the system. 
Sartre writes, “I do not consider as colonists 
either the minor public officials or the 
European workers who are at the same time 
innocent victims and beneficiaries of the 
system.”88 In this scenario, Peace Corps 
volunteers are comparable to the minor 
public officials or European workers, who 
have only ever known the system.  
The Peace Corps has been touted as 
a noble way to demonstrate patriotism, gain 
global cultural experience, and serve others 
since its founding in 1961. As it stands, the 
Peace Corps has a good reputation, and in 
the 21st century it has changed very little. 
The Brookings Institution published their 
first critique of the Peace Corps in 2003, and 
yet the most recent article, written in 2017, 
called for much of the same reforms.89 To 
reform the Peace Corps and dismantle the 
economic and cultural systems of oppression 
that it perpetuates, there will need to be 
leaders from within the system, acting as 
social justice allies with a vested interest in 
the organization. Current and aspiring Peace 
Corps volunteers must differentiate 
themselves from colonists by calling for 
change because of their knowledge of the 
system. 
There is hope for the Peace Corps 
yet, and that charge must be taken up by 
those who do care for a globalist future set 
on equitable terms. While the Peace Corps’ 
legacy may be rooted in neocolonialism and 
the white savior complex, it has the capacity 
to lead the charge against those maladies 
through its reform. The Peace Corps must 
not be an American institution, but rather an 
international institution, which will be held 
accountable by its formerly colonized 
partners and rebuilt on the principles of 
international cooperation. American leaders 
and volunteers in this institution must be 
educated on sustainable allyship to ensure 
that the Peace Corps does not fall into the 
same pattern of neocolonialism regardless of 
its new international status.  
The organization should be a tool for 
the redistribution of the wealth of the United 
States into the hands of host country 
communities, rather than the inefficient 
practice of person-to-person development. 
Host country locals should be placed in 
Peace Corps volunteer and leadership 
positions, as host countries do not lack in so-
called skilled volunteers. The organization 
should send volunteers from host countries 
to the United States to dismantle the 
perception that the Global South must rely 
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on the Global North for survival. As such, 
the organization should be funded by both 
the United States and host countries to 
separate the organization from the sway of 
foreign policy. The Peace Corps can have a 
part to play in the dismantling of the harmful 
legacy of neocolonialism. 
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